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REPARATIONS FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES 
SARAH SHERMAN-STOKES† 
ABSTRACT 
In the midst of vicious and unrelenting attacks on Central American 
asylum seekers in the United States, this Article seeks to understand his-
toric and present-day patterns of animus and discrimination facing this 
group of refugees, and to propose solutions. This Article begins by exam-
ining decades of prejudice faced by Central American asylum seekers, as 
well as attempts to right those wrongs through litigation, legislation, and 
the creation of Temporary Protected Status (TPS). Next, this Article iden-
tifies the predominant push and pull factors driving Central American ref-
ugees north—and the U.S. role in creating them. The Article then lays out 
the impact of this Administration’s systemic attacks on Central American 
asylum seekers, in particular, through family separation and zero-toler-
ance, the asylum ban and Matter of A-B-, and the framework in which ref-
ugees should be permitted to seek protection under current U.S. law. Fi-
nally, this Article evaluates several potential solutions including humani-
tarian asylum, an expansion of TPS, and litigation. Ultimately, this Article 
concludes that, in light of decades of abuse and prejudice directed at this 
class of refugees, the only adequate means of reparation is congressional 
legislation that would carve out special, tailored protections for this vul-
nerable group. 
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INTRODUCTION 
William1 grew up in El Salvador where his father was a mechanic 
and his mother sold fruit and snacks from a small storefront. When Wil-
liam was twelve years old his uncle was murdered by gang members in 
front of his home. At thirteen, gang members broke multiple bones of Wil-
liam’s father, Edwin, with baseball bats, while William stood by in tears. 
Edwin quickly fled the country, and the gang members began targeting 
William. Later that year, gang members came to William’s home threat-
ening to kill him, too. When William’s grandmother refused to open the 
door, they shot at the family home, leaving bullet holes in the walls. Soon 
thereafter, William also fled. 
Fourteen-year-old William traveled alone by foot, car, and bus to the 
U.S.–Mexico border, where he crossed the Rio Bravo by makeshift raft. 
Moments later, he was apprehended by Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) 
officials and, as an unaccompanied child, placed in the custody of the Of-
fice of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). Four months later, reunited with his 
mother in New England, William applied for asylum—legal protection for 
noncitizens who have been persecuted or who fear persecution in their 
home countries. His claim? William’s father and uncle had been police 
informants, reporting criminal gang activity to the local authorities in El 
Salvador, and William argued that he had been harmed and threatened on 
account of his relationship to them. In his application, William’s attorneys 
described how the violence and threats that both he and his family had 
suffered constituted “past persecution.” They also described that, given the 
unrelenting gang violence in El Salvador and systematic targeting of his 
male family members, the violence and threats were likely to continue 
should William be forced to return there. Indeed, his attorneys argued that 
William very likely would be harmed or killed if he returned. 
During his interview with an asylum officer, William broke down in 
tears recounting the violence he witnessed and suffered in El Salvador, and 
his fears that gang members would hurt or kill him if he returned there. He 
  
 1. This vignette is based on the stories of the Author’s former clients, though some identifying 
details have been changed to protect “William’s” identity. 
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described almost daily nightmares of gang members chasing him with 
baseball bats—the same ones they had used to beat his father. After nearly 
eleven months of anxious anticipation, William received a letter in the 
mail: he had not been granted asylum. Instead, his case had been referred 
to the Immigration Court, where a judge could reconsider his request. 
More than 66,000 children, like William, from the Northern Triangle 
countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras entered the United 
States in fiscal year 2014.2 In 2017, the U.S. government conducted more 
than 51,000 Credible Fear Interviews—an initial screening interview with 
an asylum officer conducted when a noncitizen presents to immigration 
authorities and expresses a fear of return to her home country.3 The United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) found that more than 
two-thirds of Central American-migrant children met the definition of ref-
ugee, qualifying them for protection.4 The large numbers of asylum seek-
ers from Central America arriving in the United States to seek protection 
have been described in the pejorative language of “plagues” and “natural 
disasters”5: a “flood,”6 a “surge,”7 a “tidal wave,”8 an “infestation,”9 an 
“invasion.”10 Governments do not welcome natural disasters and, as I will 
argue here, they do not, and have not historically, welcomed bona fide 
  
 2. “Since 2008, the US Government has recorded a 561 per cent rise in the number of new 
arrivals of unaccompanied and separated children.” UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, 
WOMEN ON THE RUN 2 n.12 (2015) [hereinafter WOMEN ON THE RUN]. For FY 2014, the U.S. gov-
ernment apprehended 68,541 unaccompanied children. Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Chil-
dren FY 2014, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/south-
west-border-unaccompanied-children/fy-2014 (last modified Nov. 24, 2015). 
 3. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., MONTHLY CREDIBLE AND REASONABLE FEAR 
NATIONALITY REPORTS (2017), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/USCIS/Outreach/Upcoming%20National%20Engagements/PED_FY17_CFandRFstatsThr
u09302017.pdf; see also Questions & Answers: Credible Fear Screening, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/questions-answers-
credible-fear-screening (last updated July 15, 2015). 
 4. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES REG’L OFFICE FOR THE U.S. & THE 
CARIBBEAN, CHILDREN ON THE RUN 6 [hereinafter CHILDREN ON THE RUN]. 
 5. Jane Zavisca, Metaphorical Imagery in News Reporting on Migrant Deaths, in MIGRANT 
DEATHS IN THE ARIZONA DESERT: LA VIDA NO VALE NADA 167, 171–77 (Raquel Rubio-Goldsmith 
et al. eds., 2016) (surveying ten years of newspaper reporting to identify common metaphors used to 
describe migrants, including economic metaphors (“cost,” “calculation,” “gamble”) and metaphors of 
violence). 
 6. Jean Guerrero, Group of Central Americans Seeking Asylum Reach U.S.–Mexico Border, 
NPR (Apr. 27, 2018, 4:22 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/27/606580176/group-of-central-ameri-
cans-seeking-asylum-reach-u-s-mexico-border. 
 7. Cindy Chang & Kate Linthicum, U.S. Seeing a Surge in Central American Asylum Seekers, 
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/15/local/la-me-ff-asylum-20131215. 
 8. Susan Knowles, ‘Tidal Wave’ of Central American Migrants Coming to U.S., GOP Silent, 
MEDIUM (Apr. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/@SusanKnowles_60982/tidal-wave-of-central-ameri-
can-migrants-coming-to-u-s-gop-silent-3bbf112cf28a. 
 9. See Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 19, 2018, 6:52 AM), https://twit-
ter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1009071403918864385 (claiming that “Democrats” want unauthor-
ized immigrants “to pour into and infest our Country, like MS-13”). 
 10. See Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 24, 2018, 8:02 AM), https://twit-
ter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1010900865602019329 (referring to Central American migrants and 
stating, “We cannot allow all of these people to invade our Country.”). 
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asylum seekers and refugees from Central America like William. This Ar-
ticle argues that, given the long history by the United States of exploita-
tion, intervention, and abdication of responsibility in Central America, the 
United States now has an obligation to repair—to make amends by carving 
out legislative space for the many Central American refugees who have 
been wronged and are now in need of protection.11  
Scholars have written extensively on the history of Central American 
asylum seekers in the United States and the systemic discrimination they 
have faced.12 Scholars have also written on the present-day increase in 
Central American asylum seekers and the policies of deterrence and de-
tention employed by successive presidential administrations in an effort to 
thwart asylum seekers admission into the United States.13 Others have ar-
gued persuasively of pathways forward for so-called “unconventional ref-
ugees” like those from Central America, rooting such arguments in philo-
sophical, legal, and moral terms.14 This Article fills a gap in the scholar-
ship by knitting together the historic and present-day realities faced by 
refugees of the Northern Triangle. In particular, this Article will demon-
strate patterns of racism and animus that prejudice asylum seekers’ claims 
for protection in the United States and evaluate potential solutions to pro-
tect their rights, including a reimagining of humanitarian asylum, an ex-
pansion of Temporary Protected Status (TPS), and the potential need for a 
new class action lawsuit. Ultimately, upon evaluation of the limitations of 
other potential remedies, this Article calls on Congress to carve out legis-
lative space for reparations for this group—to make amends for genera-
tions of wrongdoing—by passing legislation to specifically protect the 
rights of Central American refugees. 
  
 11. Others have argued for reparations in past refugee contexts. See, e.g., Malissia Lennox, 
Note, Refugees, Racism, and Reparations: A Critique of the United States’ Haitian Immigration Pol-
icy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 687, 688–89 (1993). 
 12. See, e.g., Ann Aita, Note, What About Us? NACARA’s Legacy and the Need to Provide 
Equal Protection to Guatemalan, Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, and Honduran Residency-Seekers in the 
United States, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 341, 344 (2000); Susan Bibler Coutin, Falling Outside: Excavating 
the History of Central American Asylum Seekers, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 569, 570, 581 (2011); 
Daniel L. Swanwick, Foreign Policy and Humanitarianism in U.S. Asylum Adjudication: Revisiting 
the Debate in the Wake of the War on Terror, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 129, 130 (2006); see also Michael 
J. Churgin, Mass Exoduses: The Response of the United States, 30 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 310, 319–
20 (1996). 
 13. See, e.g., Mary Bosworth, Katja Franko & Sharon Pickering, Punishment, Globalization 
and Migration Control: ‘Get Them the Hell Out of Here,’ 20 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 34, 35 (2018); 
David Manuel Hernández, Pursuant to Deportation: Latinos and Immigration Detention, 6 LATINO 
STUD. 35, 46 (2008); Karen Musalo & Eunice Lee, Seeking a Rational Approach to a Regional Refu-
gee Crisis: Lessons from the Summer 2014 “Surge” of Central American Women and Children at the 
US–Mexico Border, 5 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 137, 162–63 (2017). 
 14. See, e.g., Elizabeth Keyes, Unconventional Refugees, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 89, 97–99 (2017) 
(contrasting justifications for providing broader protections to refugees from the perspective of both 
Rawls and Carens, and ultimately falling somewhere in between—recognizing that “we still have du-
ties to people outside our borders when their basic rights—including that of safety—are at stake”). 
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Part I of this Article describes the U.S. government’s historical treat-
ment of asylum seekers from Central America and, specifically, the North-
ern Triangle countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. This Part 
will summarize the pivotal impact that Central American asylum seekers 
and their cases have had on the development of U.S. asylum law and pol-
icy, including through legislation and litigation in the 1980s and 1990s. In 
particular, this Part discusses the seminal lawsuit and subsequent settle-
ment in American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh15 (ABC Case), high-
lighting the discriminatory practices faced by Central American asylum 
seekers in the 1980s. 
This Part also discusses the government’s attempts to right those 
wrongs, not only through this settlement but also through creation of TPS 
program and the Asylum Officer Corps. This Article will then examine the 
continuing efficacy of the ABC Case in providing protection to the Central 
American refugees of present-day. This Part will identify to what extent 
the protections of the ABC Case and other safeguards won in the 1980s 
and 1990s continue to be effective, or not, for the changing needs of to-
day’s Central American refugees. Finally, this Part describes the current 
crisis and climate facing Central American migrants and refugees, includ-
ing: the impact of the Attorney General’s decision in Matter of A-B-16 on 
domestic and gang-violence asylum claims; the ongoing saga of “zero-
tolerance”; immigrant family separations at the southern U.S. border; and 
the recently announced “asylum ban” and concomittant “metering” at the 
U.S.–Mexico border that appears all but directed squarely at Central 
American refugees. This Part closes with a description of the absence of 
meaningful legal protections afforded to these migrants and refugees. 
Part II of this Article outlines the legal framework and statutory re-
quirements for seeking asylum in the United States. This Part will explain 
how U.S. laws have defined refugees and the criteria for seeking legal re-
lief on the basis of past and future persecution. Finally, this Part will situate 
Central American claimants within this structure and historical context, 
noting how and why they have been treated differently.  
Part III queries what the most suitable remedy is for refugees of the 
Northern Triangle in this climate of racism, animus, and a continuing de-
valuation of Central American asylum claims. Part III begins by asking 
whether humanitarian asylum, an often overlooked and perennially mis-
understood pathway to refugee protection, can provide the kind of relief 
that present-day Central American asylum seekers need. Ultimately, I de-
termine that a reimagining and expansion of humanitarian asylum is insuf-
ficient to protect the rights of Central American claimants. Next, this Ar-
ticle examines whether TPS could provide the kind of relief these appli-
cants need. In examining the history of TPS, and the recently announced 
  
 15. 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
 16. 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (Att’y Gen. 2018), abrogated by Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 
96 (D.D.C. 2018). 
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termination of TPS for several Central American countries, I similarly de-
termine that TPS is an inadequate fix. Thereafter, I assess whether, given 
the limitations of current asylum law, an unrelenting erosion of the asylum 
system by the current Department of Justice (DOJ), and the combined leg-
acies of racism and discrimination faced by Central American asylum 
seekers, we need a modern-day ABC case to ensure that the rights of these 
migrants are protected. Finally, in consideration both of the limits to the 
remedies mentioned above and past legislative successes for Central 
Americans, this Article concludes by proposing congressional action to 
address historic and present-day inequities, and patterns of discrimination 
that persist for this particular class of refugees. Just as the United States 
has carved out special legislation for other groups of migrants our govern-
ment has wronged, taking responsibility for our role in creating peril and 
hardship, I suggest that here too—in the case of Central American refu-
gees—is a place for reparation and amends. 
I. THE HISTORY OF CENTRAL AMERICAN ASYLUM DISCRIMINATION 
The treatment of asylum seekers from Central America by the U.S. 
government has historically been colored by the idea that this category of 
refugees is “generally undeserving.”17 And yet, it is Central Americans, 
who have arrived to the United States in considerable numbers since the 
1980s18 and whose large-scale migration also coincided with the passage 
of the 1980 Refugee Act, that have, in many ways, shaped modern U.S. 
asylum law.19 This Part begins by providing a brief history of refugee ad-
missions. Next, this Part describes the history of Central American migra-
tion to the United States from the twentieth to the twenty-first century; 
concomitant discrimination20 and resistance to Central American asylum 
claims;21 and legal responses thus far. 
A. History of U.S. Refugee Admissions 
Following World War II, President Truman issued an executive order 
admitting 40,000 refugees; primarily some of the more than 60 million 
  
 17. See Coutin, supra note 12, at 570. 
 18. Gabriel Lesser & Jeanne Batalova, Central American Immigrants in the United States, 
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-american-
immigrants-united-states (noting that the population of Central Americans living in the United States 
tripled between 1980 and 1990, and that by 2015, 3.4 million people, or 8% of U.S. immigrants, were 
from Central America). 
 19. Coutin, supra note 12; see also Churgin, supra note 12, at 319. 
 20. Notably, the animus and discrimination of this Administration—and others—has certainly 
not been limited to Central Americans. Other groups of migrants and refugees have similarly endured 
hateful rhetoric and racist policies designed to limit their admission and presence in the United States. 
A larger discussion of the discrimination facing those groups is outside the scope of this paper. See, 
e.g., Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, Exec. Order No. 
13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017). 
 21. Notably, discrimination and resistance to asylum claims has not been limited to the Central 
American context. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Haitian Asylum Seekers: Interdiction and Immi-
grants’ Rights, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J., 695 (1993). 
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Europeans who had been driven from their homes during the war.22 There-
after, the 1948 Displaced Persons Act signaled growing concern for refu-
gees from communist countries and territories, as did subsequent acts, in-
cluding the Refugee Relief Acts of 195323 and 1954,24 the Refugee Es-
capee Act of 1957,25 and the Fair Share Act of 1960.26 Finally, in 1965, 
Congress created a preference category explicitly for refugees, though lim-
ited to those fleeing the Middle East or communist-controlled territories.27 
It was not until the Refugee Act of 1980 that asylum was explicitly made 
available28 to nationals fleeing violence in noncommunist countries.29 In-
deed, one of the explicit goals of the Act was to “assure greater equity in 
the treatment of refugees” and to repeal the previous law’s “discriminatory 
treatment of refugees” and replace it with a new definition of refugee that 
no longer applied only to refugees fleeing communism or the Middle 
East.30 As Deborah Anker and others have argued, the Refugee Act of 
1980 “was a clear statement of intention of the United States Congress to 
move away from a refugee and asylum policy which, for over forty years, 
discriminated on the basis of ideology, geography and even national 
origin, to one that was rooted in principles of humanitarianism and objec-
tivity.”31 In particular, the Act included a statutory definition of asylum to 
curtail what was perceived as the “politicized nature of the Executive’s 
decision making.”32 Though in theory the 1980 Act brought U.S. law into 
conformity with international law and norms related to the admission and 
processing of asylum seekers and refugees, the anti-communist legacy of 
refugee law, as well as other factors, impacted its application.33 
Soon after the passage of the 1980 Act, migration patterns to the 
United States shifted. In 1980, there were 354,000 Central Americans liv-
ing in the United States; by 1990, that number had more than tripled to 
1,134,000.34 By 2015, the number had grown to 3,385,000 with immi-
  
 22. Statement and Directive by the President on Immigration to the United States of Certain 
Displaced Persons and Refugees in Europe, 1 PUB. PAPERS 572, 576–78 (Dec. 22, 1945), 
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=515&st=&st1=. 
 23. Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 400. 
 24. Refugee Relief Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-751, 68 Stat. 1044. 
 25. Refugee Escapee Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639. 
 26. Fair Share Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504. 
 27. See Hart-Celler Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965); The Refugee Act of 1979, S. 
643: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 9 (1979) (statement of former Senator, 
newly appointed U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Dick Clark) (testifying that prior to 1980, ref-
ugee programs were a “patchwork” of different programs “originally designed to deal with people 
fleeing communist regimes in Eastern Europe or repressive governments in the Middle East”). 
 28. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 
267. 
 29. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. 
 30. Edward M. Kennedy, Refugee Act of 1980, 15 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 141, 142–43 (1981). 
 31. Deborah Anker, The Refugee Act of 1980: An Historical Perspective, 5 DEF. ALIEN 89, 89 
(1982). 
 32. Id. at 93. 
 33. Churgin, supra note 12, at 318–22. 
 34. Lesser & Batalova, supra note 18. 
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grants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—the Northern Trian-
gle countries—accounting for almost 90% of the total growth in the pop-
ulation since 1980.35 But why were they fleeing? 
B. Civil Wars in Central America Drive Refugees North Where They 
Face Discrimination in Adjudication of Their Claims 
During the 1980s and 1990s, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua 
sustained devastating civil wars, political unrest, and rampant human 
rights abuses.36 Tens of thousands were killed across the region, and in El 
Salvador and Guatemala, the United States was strongly allied with the 
governments in power, pumping millions of dollars into military and par-
amilitary units who committed mass atrocities in the name of fighting 
communism.37 Bombing campaigns devastated civilian areas in El Salva-
dor, and military and paramilitary groups swept through indigenous com-
munities in Guatemala committing disappearances, human rights abuses, 
and massacres.38 In Guatemala, a truth commission has blamed the degree 
of brutality shown during its civil war on the training that military officers 
  
 35. Id. 
 36. BEATRIZ MANZ, CENTRAL AMERICA (GUATAMALA, EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS, 
NICARAGUA): PATTERNS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 2–3 (2008) (“From 1954 onwards Guate-
mala was governed by one military dictatorship after another, with various levels of repression, cul-
minating with genocide in the 1980s. A rebel movement with Mayan support was met by widespread 
military counter-insurgency operations, directed as well at the civilian population. This resulted in 
over 600 massacres, the murder of 200,000 people, the destruction of more than 400 villages, and the 
displacement of approximately one million of the country’s 7 million inhabitants. . . . El Salvador has 
often been called the country with ‘fourteen families’ because such a small ruling elite holds land and 
economic power. The efforts of insurgents to change this power structure, as in Guatemala, led to 
internal wars during the 1970s and 1980s. As a result, at least 70,000 citizens were killed and millions 
were displaced internally or outside their country as refugees or undocumented migrants in the United 
States.”). 
 37. For a selection of works detailing significant and ongoing U.S. involvement in massacres, 
wars, and related human rights abuses across Central America, see MARK DANNER, THE MASSACRE 
AT EL MOZOTE (1993); STEPHEN KINZER, BLOOD OF BROTHERS: LIFE AND WAR IN NICARAGUA 
(1991); STEPHEN SCHLESINGER & STEPHEN KINZER, BITTER FRUIT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE 
AMERICAN COUP IN GUATEMALA (1982); see also Karen Musalo, El Salvador—A Peace Worse than 
War: Violence, Gender and a Failed Legal Response, 30 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 11 (2018). 
 38. LEIGH BINFORD, THE EL MOZOTE MASSACRE: ANTHROPOLOGY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3–4 
(1996) (describing brutality in El Salvador and the United States’ role in the El Mozote Massacre); 
LINDA GREEN, FEAR AS A WAY OF LIFE: MAYAN WIDOWS IN RURAL GUATEMALA 4–5 (1999) (provid-
ing an overview of the massacres that occurred in Guatemala and the lives of the widows and orphans 
left behind); TOMMIE SUE MONTGOMERY, REVOLUTION IN EL SALVADOR: FROM CIVIL STRIFE TO 
CIVIL PEACE 148–50 (2d ed. 1995) (providing a detailed account of the United States’ role in Salva-
doran affairs in the 1980s); DIANE M. NELSON, A FINGER IN THE WOUND: BODY POLITICS IN 
QUINCENTENNIAL GUATEMALA 7–9 (1999) (providing an overview of Guatemala’s history and con-
text for its thirty-year war); JENNIFER SCHIRMER, THE GUATEMALAN MILITARY PROJECT: A 
VIOLENCE CALLED DEMOCRACY 1 (1998) (“In Guatemala, a democracy was ‘born’ out of the womb 
of a counterinsurgency campaign in 1982 that killed an estimated 75,000, razed a proclaimed 440 
villages, and displaced over one million regugees.”); see also Ordonez-Quino v. Holder, 760 F.3d 80, 
83 (1st Cir. 2014) (describing brutality and serious human rights abuses in Guatemala). 
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received at the U.S.-run School of the Americas.39 Many of those who sur-
vived the violence fled to the United States seeking asylum.40 It is esti-
mated that between 1981 and 1990, almost one million Salvadorans and 
Guatemalans entered the United States in search of protection and safe 
haven.41 Indeed, the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
reported “a seven fold increase in Central American asylum requests over” 
one four-year period in the 1980s: “from about 7,000 in 1985 to over 
50,000 in 1988.”42 Early on, it was clear what law enforcement, Congress, 
political leaders, courts, and adjudicators thought of these Central Ameri-
cans: that they were undeserving economic migrants whose admission 
would open the “floodgates” for the world’s most poor and vulnerable to 
come pouring into the United States.43  
In 1982, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) revealed sus-
pected evidence of bias against asylum seekers from Central America in a 
lawsuit. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California is-
sued a preliminary injunction, finding that the then-INS had violated the 
rights of Salvadoran asylum seekers.44 The district court found that Salva-
doran asylum seekers had been coerced into signing “voluntary departure” 
orders—effectively an agreement to “voluntarily” return to their home 
countries thereby giving up their right to apply for asylum.45 The court 
further found that these asylum seekers were denied access to counsel and 
to legal information about their rights as well as placed in solitary confine-
ment without an administrative hearing.46 Following lengthy proceedings, 
in 1988, the district court issued the following orders: (1) INS was perma-
nently enjoined from coercing Salvadoran detainees into signing voluntary 
departure agreements; (2) INS was required to notify Salvadoran detainees 
of their right to political asylum and their right to representation by counsel 
in deportation proceedings; and (3) INS was enjoined from transferring 
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 40. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN 
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 41. Susan Gzesh, Central Americans and Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era, MIGRATION POL’Y 
INST. (Apr. 1, 2006), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-americans-and-asylum-policy-
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 42. NANCY R. KINGSBURY, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-NSIAD-89-16, 
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 43. Keyes, supra note 14, at 127–28 (quoting James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the 
Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, 31 HARV. INT’L L.J. 129, 169–70 (1990)); Musalo & Lee, supra 
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gates opening to asylees from places like El Salvador who would have difficulty assimilating). 
 44. Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 385–86 (C.D. Cal. 1982). 
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detainees irrespective of established attorney–client relationships.47 
Throughout the court’s decision is a recognition of the harms suffered by 
both sides during the devastating civil war in El Salvador and the credible 
threats of violence faced by Salvadoran refugees.48 
And yet, even after an injunction came down in Orantes-Hernandez 
v. Meese,49 the U.S. government continued to advance the false narrative 
that Central American refugees were simply economic migrants, and con-
gressional testimony echoed that sentiment. Assistant Secretary of State 
Elliott Abrams dismissed them as part of the usual and long-standing pat-
tern of “large-scale illegal immigration [from El Salvador]” and INS As-
sociate Commissioner Doris Meissner agreed, noting that Salvadorans 
were journeying north as the result of “poverty and lack of overall eco-
nomic opportunity.”50 Consistent with this rhetoric was the instruction re-
layed by the U.S. Department of State (DOS) to asylum adjudicators—
specifically, deny the asylum claims of Guatemalan and Salvadoran asy-
lum seekers.51 The result? Claims of political bias in asylum adjudication 
were well-founded.52 Asylum grant rates for Salvadorans and Guatema-
lans in 1984 were both under 3%.53 In stark contrast, “the approval rate for 
Iranians was 60 percent, 40 percent for Afghans fleeing the Soviet inva-
sion, and 32 percent for Poles.”54 At the same time, the U.S. District Court 
for the Central District of California ordered an injunction after finding 
that INS agents “directed, intimidated, or otherwise coerced Salvadorans 
  
 47. Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1511–12 (C.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d sub nom. 
Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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 49. 685 F. Supp. 1488. 
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Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 66–
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manitarian Affairs, and Doris M. Meissner, Executive Associate Commissioner, Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service). 
 51. Swanwick, supra note 12, at 133–34. 
 52. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW 
AND POLICY 1032–33 (5th ed. 2009) (describing historical accusations of political bias in the asylum 
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2019] REPARATIONS FOR REFUGEES 595 
within their custody, who had not expressed a desire to return to El Salva-
dor” to agree to “voluntary departure.”55 The new, facially neutral defini-
tion of “refugee,” intended by the 1980 Act to assure “equality” in appli-
cation, remained deeply tainted by a Cold War legacy of anti-communist 
rhetoric and action that was disproportionately and negatively impacting 
Central American asylum claimants.56 
This clear disparity in treatment came to a head in 1985 when more 
than eighty religious and refugee groups brought suit in federal court, chal-
lenging the patterns of discrimination in asylum cases involving Salvador-
ans and Guatemalans.57 They sued the INS, the Executive Office for Im-
migration Review (EOIR)—an office of the DOJ responsible for adjudi-
cating all immigration cases—and the DOS.58 That lawsuit, now com-
monly referred to as the “ABC Case,” alleged that the government’s dis-
criminatory practices violated the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.59 Over the next several years, the government attempted to dispose 
of the case three times while the plaintiffs pursued extensive discovery 
regarding the government’s discriminatory practices.60  
Then, in July of 1990, legacy INS promulgated new asylum regula-
tions, including the creation of a specialized asylum officer corps to carry 
out asylum adjudication.61 At the time, Attorney General Dick Thornburgh 
noted that, under these new rules, asylum would become a “more fair and 
sensitive” procedure that generates “uniform and consistent results.”62 
Driving home the corollary between the ABC Case and these new regula-
tions, Senator Edward M. Kennedy commented at the time, “[t]oo often in 
recent years we have tolerated a double standard, under which asylum has 
been unfairly denied to legitimate refugees for fear of embarrassing 
friendly but repressive governments.”63 It is hard to imagine that he was 
not thinking explicitly of our neighbors to the south. 
Finally, the parties reached settlement in 1990, approved by the 
Northern District Court of California in 1991.64 The agreement provides 
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 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 830; Am. Baptist Churches v. Meese, 666 F. Supp. 1358, 1360 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
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1990, at A16. 
 62. Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Attorney General Thornburgh Signs Final Asylum Regula-
tions (July 18, 1990), http://digital.library.pitt.edu/islandora/ob-
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 63. Pear, supra note 61, at A16. 
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de novo asylum interviews—a new interview in which all issues are re-
viewed as if for the first time—and adjudication for previously denied 
cases of Salvadorans who had arrived in the United States by September 
19, 1990, and Guatemalans who had arrived by October 1, 1990.65 The 
settlement also provides work authorization and stays of deportation for 
certain classes of Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum seekers as well as a 
prohibition on detention for most class members.66  
The introductory paragraphs of the ABC Case agreement set out im-
portant guideposts for asylum adjudications, particularly as pertaining to 
discrimination directed toward asylum applicants from Guatemala and El 
Salvador, noting: 
[F]oreign policy and border enforcement considerations are not rele-
vant to the determination of whether an applicant for asylum has a 
well-founded fear of persecution;  
the fact that an individual is from a country whose government the 
United States supports or with which it has favorable relations is not 
relevant to the determination of whether an applicant for asylum has a 
well-founded fear of persecution;  
whether or not the United States Government agrees with the political 
or ideological beliefs of the individual is not relevant to the determi-
nation of whether an applicant for asylum has a well-founded fear of 
persecution; 
the same standard for determining whether or not an applicant has a 
well-founded fear of persecution applies to Salvadorans and Guatema-
lans as applies to all other nationalities . . . .67 
Finally, the settlement referenced a new program created by the Im-
migration Act of 1990, TPS, which allowed registration for this new pro-
gram to count as registration for the benefits of the settlement agreement.68 
The TPS program allows the Secretary of Homeland Security to designate 
a foreign state, or part of a foreign state, where it is not currently safe for 
individuals to return home in any of three circumstances: (a) ongoing 
armed conflict; (b) an environmental disaster; or (c) where “extraordinary 
and temporary conditions” prevent safe return and allowing the state’s na-
tionals to remain in the United States would not be contrary to the national 
interest.69 El Salvador was the very first country to receive TPS and the 
only country to have been granted TPS through congressional action, via 
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the Immigration Act of 1990.70 Importantly though, TPS is not a grant of 
permanent status nor does it provide a pathway to such status. TPS was 
intended to be, as its name implies, “temporary.”71 But the promise of TPS 
has been illusory for many migrants, and now more so than ever. In 2017 
and 2018, the Trump Administration announced the end of TPS for Salva-
dorans, Hondurans, and Nicaraguans.72 The end of this program will mean 
that nearly 260,000 Central Americans will be at risk of deportation in the 
coming months.73 
C. Present-Day Animus and Discrimination Continues to Plague Central 
Americans as Refugees Flee in Large Numbers 
Despite the promise of historic legislation and litigation in the 1980s 
and 1990s, intended to provide full and fair procedure to asylum seekers 
from all countries, and specifically El Salvador and Guatemala, a new pat-
tern of discrimination directed at Central American asylum seekers has 
emerged in recent years. Michael Churgin was prescient when, in 1996, 
he spoke of the “moral relevance of numbers,” predicting that large groups 
of asylum seekers would (again) face “a new aggressive turn to prevent 
the operation of law from impeding governmental action.”74 Central 
Americans have faced this “aggressive turn” head on. 
Beginning in 2011, the United States saw a dramatic increase in the 
number of people, and specifically unaccompanied immigrant children, 
migrating from the Northern Triangle. Many, if not most, of them were 
seeking protection from gang and domestic violence. This migration 
peaked in fiscal year 2014, when the U.S. Border Patrol apprehended 
nearly 52,000 Central American children crossing the U.S.–Mexico Bor-
der.75 Thereafter, the UNHCR conducted detailed and extensive inter-
views with these young people, revealing that nearly two-thirds of them 
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had suffered harms and persecution that warranted international refugee 
protection.76  
The UNHCR has found that men and women, too, are fleeing the 
Northern Triangle in large numbers, reporting that they and their children 
faced “extreme levels of violence on a near-daily basis.”77 Eighty-five per-
cent of women interviewees reported living in a neighborhood controlled 
by gangs or other violent criminal groups.78 “Sixty-two percent of women 
reported that they were confronted with dead bodies in their neighbor-
hoods,” many on a weekly basis.79 Moreover, the women interviewed re-
ported “prolonged instances of physical, sexual, and psychological domes-
tic violence, for which authorities provided no meaningful help.”80 Among 
the interviewees, two discernible patterns emerged that united these 
women and children in their need to seek safety: they had suffered vio-
lence by organized, armed criminal actors—largely gangs—and domestic 
violence in their homes.81 
D. The U.S. Role in Creating the Peril  
The United States bears some responsibility for the origins and esca-
lation of gang and domestic violence in Central America. On the heels of 
violent civil wars across Central America in the 1980s and 1990s, millions 
of refugees fled north, struggling to make ends meet in poor neighbor-
hoods across the United States.82 Moreover, when their parents fled north 
to escape the devastation wrought by civil war, many children were left 
behind,83 cared for by grandparents and other relatives.84 This exodus led 
to a generational gap that opened a vacuum ripe for gang recruitment. So-
cial-science research confirms that children are more susceptible to gang 
recruitment in the absence of parental guidance.85 As their communities 
crumbled around them and they faced crises of hunger, unemployment, 
and the long-term impact of debilitating civil wars, children were not in a 
position to resist the allure of gang recruitment, including the financial 
support and stability a gang was perceived to provide—financial support 
and stability that was at times absent in their home lives.86 Originating in 
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the Salvadoran refugee and immigrant communities of Los Angeles in the 
1980s, Mara Salvatrucha (MS or MS-13) and the 18th Street gang (Calle 
18) emerged largely in U.S. jails, as immigrant detainees and inmates were 
confronted, and challenged, by U.S. prison gangs.87  
Then, in 1996, Congress passed, and President Clinton signed, re-
gressive immigration laws dramatically expanding the list of crimes con-
sidered “aggravated felonies” for immigration purposes, the result of 
which is nearly mandatory deportation from the United States.88 The im-
pact on immigrant communities was devastating: more than 67,000 immi-
grants were removed as a result of criminal convictions.89 As others have 
explained, mass deportation and family separation sent thousands of Cen-
tral American young people back to countries where they had few family 
connections. At least partially as a result of this family disintegration, chil-
dren left behind leaned on gangs for support.90 In the politically and eco-
nomically fragile post-war region of Central America, gang members 
wielded significant power, mobilized young members, and unified their 
structure and influence.91 In response, tough on crime “Mano Duro” poli-
cies swept the region, and Central American prison populations exploded, 
further fostering, and reifying, gang crime and gang culture.92 In the ensu-
ing years, many tried to escape the gang violence in Central America—
some individuals were fleeing forced gang recruitment, as members93 or 
as gang girlfriends;94 others were fleeing harm for having renounced the 
gang;95 and still others were seeking safety after serving as police inform-
ants or testifying against the gang.96 
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The U.S. and Central American governments also play a role in ena-
bling patterns of domestic violence and ensuring that abusers in the North-
ern Triangle face impunity. Following the brutal violence of the wars in 
Central America, funded in large part by the United States,97 many perpe-
trators of violence were not held accountable. Experts have argued that the 
failure to hold perpetrators of wartime violence accountable—on a domes-
tic or international level—has played an important role in perpetuating vi-
olence. In its 2001 report, the Commission on Human Rights stated that 
this failure “is one of the most important factors contributing to the persis-
tence of such violations, as well as criminal and social violence.”98 Indeed, 
the former Attorney General of Guatemala has argued that the traits dis-
played by domestic abusers including “their sense of power and their pre-
sumption that they would never be held accountable for their crimes” is 
the same attitude held by those who committed war crimes.99 And moreo-
ver, that this has “contributed to the creation of a climate of impunity, and 
the message that these types of crimes are not considered to be of any im-
portance either to the society or to the state.”100 
Despite the horrific violence Central Americans are facing and our 
role in creating the peril they are now fleeing, the current Administration 
and the DOJ, among other law enforcement agencies, have taken every 
opportunity to single out Central American men, women, and children for 
discrimination in the asylum and protection process, both through public 
commentary and the legal process, reflecting deep animus toward Central 
American refugees and values tinged with both racism and sexism. In their 
actions and language, these officials have advanced the erroneous idea that 
these migrants are either criminals, economic opportunists, or both, and in 
need of deterrence, detention, and deportation.  
While this rhetoric has intensified during the Trump Administration, 
it did not begin here. In 2014, in the throes of increased migration from 
Central America, then-Vice President Biden remarked conclusively that 
“none of these children or women bringing children will be eligible” to 
remain in the United States despite being legally entitled to an individual 
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screening to evaluate their fears of return and eligibility for asylum.101 
Meanwhile, the Obama Administration set up makeshift family detention 
facilities in Artesia, New Mexico, and elsewhere, to process and quickly 
remove thousands of women and children.102 At the time, a senior, un-
named, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) official said the goal 
was to process the immigrants and have them deported “within 10 to 15 
days to send a message back to their home countries that there are conse-
quences for illegal immigration.”103 What is worse, ignoring our domestic 
and international legal obligations to evaluate migrants’ claims for protec-
tion on a case-by-case basis, the Obama Administration’s message from 
the top meant that adjudicators down below felt emboldened to deny bona 
fide claims for relief.104 
In September 2017, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions, speaking to 
law enforcement in Massachusetts, pejoratively described Central Ameri-
can children as “wolves in sheep’s clothing.”105 He erroneously suggested 
that refugee children from the Northern Triangle who flee north to the 
United States are, in fact, gang members, surreptitiously entering our 
country and feigning fear.106 In the spring 2018, President Trump took to 
regularly referring to Central Americans and Central American gang mem-
bers as “animals.”107 Indeed, at a campaign rally for GOP Representative 
Marsha Blackburn, he invited attendees to participate in a call-and-re-
sponse, joyfully inquiring, “What was the name?” to which the crowd 
gleefully responded, “Animals!”108 Shortly thereafter, apparently seeking 
to explain President Trump’s words and to specify that he was referring 
only to Central American gang members, the White House Office of Com-
munications issued a 488-word statement, “What You Need to Know 
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approval rate for Artesia families was just 37.8%—less than half the nationwide figure.”). 
 105. Lauren Dezenski, Sessions: Many Unaccompanied Minors Are ‘Wolves in Sheep’s Cloth-
ing,’ POLITICO (Sept. 21, 2017, 6:19 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/21/jeff-sessions-
border-unaccompanied-minors-wolves-242991. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Matthew Nussbaum & Christopher Cadelago, White House Doubles Down on Trump’s ‘An-
imals’ Comments, POLITICO (May 21, 2018, 5:19 PM), https://www.polit-
ico.com/story/2018/05/21/trump-animals-white-house-immigrants-601843. 
 108. Trump Debuts New MS-13 Call-and-Response: ‘What Was the Name?’ ‘ANIMALS!’, 
DAILY BEAST (May 29, 2018), https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-debuts-new-ms-13-call-and-re-
sponse-what-was-the-name-animals. 
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About the Violent Animals of MS-13,” that uses the contemptuous term, 
“animals,” a jaw-dropping ten times.109 
The Attorney General and courts have also shown their hand in writ-
ten decisions. In 2017, Judge Wilkinson, a federal judge on the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, wrote a concurrence in a decision denying asy-
lum to Maria Suyapa Velasquez, a Honduran woman whose mother-in-
law kidnapped her son on multiple occasions, and threatened to kill Ve-
lasquez. Later, the son of Velasquez’s mother-in-law murdered Ve-
lasquez’s sister, believing her to be Velasquez.110 Dismissing her claim, 
Judge Wilkinson opined that the harm she suffered was “secondary to a 
grander pattern of criminal extortion that pervades petitioners’ socie-
ties.”111 Quoting Wilkinson in part, then-Attorney General Sessions also 
suggested that there is just something inherently violent about Central 
American people and communities, noting the “pervasive nature of . . . 
violent criminality” in Central America.112 
Then, on June 11, 2018, the then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions is-
sued the decision, Matter of A-B-.113 Prior to the Attorney General’s deci-
sion in A-B-, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held in a preceden-
tial decision that survivors of domestic violence could qualify for asy-
lum.114 The Board arrived at this decision after nearly two decades of ad-
vocacy and litigation over the matter—its decision was carefully reasoned, 
and the result of rare consensus between the private bar and law enforce-
ment agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).115 
Indeed, the question whether survivors of domestic violence were a cog-
nizable “particular social group” (PSG) such to qualify them for asylum, 
was previously certified by three different Attorneys General (one Demo-
crat and two Republican).116  
But seeking to insulate such a sensitive matter from political whims, 
all three of these Attorneys General chose to leave the final determination 
  
 109. What You Need to Know About the Violent Animals of MS-13, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (May 21, 
2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/need-know-violent-animals-ms-13. 
 110. Velasquez v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 188, 191–92, 198 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 111. Id. at 198–99 (Wilkinson J., concurring). 
 112. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 323 (Att’y Gen. 2018), abrogated by Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. 
Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 113. Id. at 316. 
 114. A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388–89 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 
316. 
 115. STEVEN R. ABRAMS ET AL., AILA DOC. NO. 18061134, RETIRED IMMIGRATION JUDGES 
AND FORMER MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S DECISION IN MATTER OF A-B-, at 1(2018), http://www.aila.org/infonet/retired-
ijs-and-former-members-of-the-bia-issue. 
 116. Samantha Schmidt, ‘Back to the Dark Ages’: Session’s Asylum Ruling Reverses Decades of 
Women’s Rights Progress, Critics Say, WASH. POST (June 12, 2018), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/06/12/back-to-the-dark-ages-sessions-asylum-ruling-re-
verses-decades-of-womens-rights-progress-critics-say. 
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to the immigration judges (IJ) and the BIA.117 That changed on June 11, 
2018.  
Then-Attorney General Sessions’s decision in this case calls out by 
name Central American migrants who are fleeing domestic or gang vio-
lence.118 The noncitizen at the center of A-B- is Salvadoran and, though 
not all women fleeing domestic violence are Central American, Sessions 
suggests they are, noting that the holding he is now overruling in Matter 
of A-R-C-G-,119 in which the asylum seeker was Guatemalan, was wrongly 
extended “to encompass most Central American domestic violence vic-
tims.”120 In so doing, he both fails to recognize the many survivors of do-
mestic violence from countries other than Central America who have al-
ready received asylum in the United States and he also crystallizes the par-
ticular animus he reserves for Central American refugees.  
Moreover, in this decision, Sessions seems to further advance a false 
and dangerous narrative around Central American asylum seekers. 
Namely, that they are taking advantage of a loophole in the law that allows 
them to seek protection.121 Sessions contends that “there are alternative 
proper and legal channels for seeking admission to the United States other 
than entering the country illegally and applying for asylum in a removal 
proceeding.”122 Of course, such rhetoric is in line with previous remarks 
Sessions made in 2017, accusing “dirty immigration lawyers” of using 
“magic words” to help would-be asylum seekers exploit similar loop-
holes.123 
The main takeaway that Sessions intends to convey through A-B- is 
succinct and clear.124 Sessions states, in unequivocal terms, that in most 
cases, “claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence or gang violence 
perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for asylum.”125 
While advocates agree that A-B- should be read more narrowly, just over-
turning the particular PSG in A-R-C-G-,126 the takeaway has in fact been 
interpreted much more broadly. Following A-B-, on June 13, 2018, U.S. 
  
 117. ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 115. 
 118. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 316, 320, 332. 
 119. 26 I. & N. Dec. 388. 
 120. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 331–32. 
 121. Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Review 
(Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-
executive-office-immigration-review (contending, without evidence, that “over the years, smart attor-
neys have exploited loopholes in the law, court rulings, and lack of resources to substantially under-
mine the intent of Congress” and that “[DOJ] can close loopholes and clarify our asylum laws to ensure 
that they help those they were intended to help”). 
 122. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 345. 
 123. Sessions, supra note 121. 
 124. See A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See, e.g., NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., ASYLUM PRACTICE ADVISORY: APPLYING FOR 
ASYLUM AFTER MATTER OF A-B-, at 1 (2018), https://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/de-
fault/files/content-type/resource/documents/2018-06/Matter%20of%20A-B-%20Practice%20Advi-
sory%20-%20Final%20-%206.21.18.pdf. 
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Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) issued interim written 
guidance instructing asylum officers to apply A-B- to credible fear inter-
views.127 On July 11, 2018, final written guidance was issued that seems 
to all but foreclose claims based on domestic and gang violence. Taken 
together, these new credible fear policies seem intent on denying relief to 
bona fide refugees.128 As outlined in a recently filed suit by the ACLU and 
the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies (CGRS), the new policies not 
only instruct officers to deny virtually all claims related to these harms but 
they also impose heightened standards for showing nexus; impose inap-
propriate and untenable evidentiary burdens on applicants to articulate 
cognizable PSGs; and instruct officers to improperly exercise discretion to 
deny claims and disregard contrary court of appeals precedent.129 In De-
cember 2018, Judge Sullivan of the U.S. District Court in Washington, 
D.C., held that these policies—instructing asylum officers to ”gener-
ally” deny claims related to gang and gender violence—violate immigra-
tion laws.130 The court explained that “there is no legal basis for an effec-
tive categorical ban” on such claims and granted the request for a perma-
nent injunction against the policies.131 
The government’s continued discrimination against Central Ameri-
can migrants and refugees has also manifested in other ways. Beginning 
in April 2018, the Trump Administration began a “zero-tolerance” policy 
aimed at deterring predominantly Central American families seeking 
safety and refuge at the southern U.S. border.132 The government’s zero-
tolerance policy included a mandate to criminally prosecute every unau-
thorized entrant into the United States,133 an unprecedented exercise of law 
enforcement authority. The government claimed that a necessary and nat-
  
 127. AILA Doc. No. 18061930, Vox Obtains USCIS Interim Guidance on Matter of A-B-, AM. 
IMMIGR. LAW. ASS’N (June 13, 2018), https://www.aila.org/infonet/vox-obtains-uscis-interim-guid-
ance-matter-of-a-b. 
 128. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PM-602-0162, 
POLICY MEMORANDUM: GUIDANCE FOR PROCESSING REASONABLE FEAR, CREDIBLE FEAR, ASYLUM, 
AND REFUGEE CLAIMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MATTER OF A-B- (2018), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/2018-06-18-PM-602-0162-
USCIS-Memorandum-Matter-of-A-B.pdf. 
 129. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 4–5, Grace v. Sessions, No. 1:18-CV-
01853, 2018 WL 3812445 (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/grace-v-ses-
sions-complaint (alleging that such instructions are violations of the INA, the Refugee Act, the Ad-
ministrative Procedures Act, Separation of Powers, and Due Process). 
 130. Court Rules Trump Policies Denying Asylum Protections to People Fleeing Domestic and 
Gang Violence Are Illegal, U.C. HASTINGS CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD. (Dec. 19, 2018), 
https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/news/court-rules-trump-policies-denying-asylum-protections-people-flee-
ing-domestic-and-gang-violence. 
 131. Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 126, 146 (2018), appeal filed Jan. 19, 2019. 
 132. President Donald J. Trump Is Acting to Enforce the Law, While Keeping Families Together, 
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (June 20, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-don-
ald-j-trump-acting-enforce-law-keeping-families-together [hereinafter Briefing Statement]. 
 133. Q&A: Trump Administration’s “Zero-Tolerance” Immigration Policy, HUM. RTS. WATCH 
(Aug. 16, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/08/16/qa-trump-administrations-zero-tol-
erance-immigration-policy. 
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ural byproduct of this criminal prosecution was the separation of immi-
grant children from their parents.134 During six weeks in April and May of 
2018, more than 2,300 immigrant children were separated from their par-
ents according to the DHS.135 
Following widespread public outrage at this policy, President Trump 
signed an Executive Order, “Affording Congress an Opportunity to Ad-
dress Family Separation.”136 The President’s Executive Order purported to 
put an end to family separation by inviting Congress and the courts to 
amend the law to allow for prolonged and indefinite family detention.137 
Specifically, the Administration asked the Attorney General to file a re-
quest to amend the 1997 Flores settlement, which has been interpreted by 
a district court judge to forbid the detention of immigrant children for 
longer than twenty days.138 The Executive Order further suggests that, as-
suming Flores is amended to allow prolonged and indefinite family deten-
tion, the DHS is instructed to detain migrant families “throughout the pen-
dency of . . . immigration proceedings.”139 On June 26, 2018, a federal 
judge in California granted an injunction ordering that the Trump Admin-
istration end the practice of separating immigrant families.140 He ordered 
that all children be reunited with their parents within thirty days.141 Not-
withstanding the court’s order, by July 26, 2018, more than seven hundred 
children remained separated from their families, though the government 
contended this was the result of “ineligibility” on the part of parents.142 Of 
those parents declared “not eligible,” more than 460 had already been de-
ported.143 Another 127 parents had apparently “waived” their rights to be 
  
 134. Liz Goodwin, ‘Children Are Being Used as a Tool’ in Trump’s Effort to Stop Border Cross-
ings, BOS. GLOBE (June 10, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2018/06/09/bordersep-
arations/Z95z4eFZjyfqCLG9pyHjAO/story.html; Lomi Kriel, New ‘Zero Tolerance’ Policy Over-
whelms South Texas Courts, HOUS. CHRONICLE (June 9, 2018, 11:30 AM), 
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/texas/article/New-zero-tolerance-policy-
overwhelms-South-12981190.php. This assertion is dubious at best. Children and parents, in Texas, 
were held in CBP facilities together. When parents were briefly brought into criminal court to receive 
“time served” for their unlawful entry, their children were removed. This was not necessary—children 
and parents could stay, and had been staying, together in CBP custody. See E-mail from Denise Gil-
man, Co-Dir., University of Texas School of Law to Sarah Sherman-Stokes et al., Clinical Instructor, 
Lecturer of Law, and Assoc. Dir. of the Immigrants’ Rights & Human Trafficking Program, Bos. Univ. 
Sch. of Law (June 20, 2018) (on file with author). 
 135. Dara Lind, New Statistics: The Government Is Separating 65 Children a Day from Parents 
at the Border, VOX (June 19, 2018 3:17 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/6/19/17479138/how-many-
families-separated-border-immigration. 
 136. Exec. Order No. 13,841, 83 Fed. Reg. 29,435 (June 20, 2018). 
 137. See id.; Briefing Statement, supra note 132. 
 138. Exec. Order No. 13,841, 83 Fed. Reg. 29,435, 29,436; Briefing Statement, supra note 132. 
 139. Exec. Order No. 13,841, 83 Fed. Reg. 29,435, 29,436. 
 140. Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1149 (S.D. Cal. 2018). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Madeleine Aggeler, Why Some Immigrant Parents Aren’t Eligible to Be Reunited with Their 
Children, N.Y. MAG.: THE CUT (July 27, 2018), https://www.thecut.com/2018/07/family-reunifica-
tion-deadline-ineligible-parents.html. 
 143. Jonathan Blitzer, The Government Has Decided that Hundreds of Immigrant Parents Are 
Ineligible to Be Reunited with Their Kids. Who Are They?, NEW YORKER (July 26, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-government-has-decided-that-hundreds-of-immi-
grant-parents-are-ineligible-to-be-reunited-with-their-kids-who-are-they. 
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reunited with their children, though serious, concerning questions remain 
about whether such waiver was knowing, with the ACLU arguing that the 
government acted in a “coercive and misleading” manner that led parents 
to sign documents without understanding the impact of their waiver.144 In 
early August, the government all but abdicated responsibility for the re-
maining separated families, arguing that it was up to the ACLU to bring 
the remaining children and parents back together.145 At the time of publi-
cation, a federal judge has stayed further deportations of previously sepa-
rated families.146 
Then, in the fall 2018, as a migrant caravan of thousands of Central 
American asylum seekers wound its way north through Central America 
and Mexico, en route to the United States, the President’s anti-Central 
American rhetoric intensified.147 In direct response to these asylum seek-
ers, on November 8, 2018, DHS and the DOJ issued an interim final rule 
foreclosing asylum to any noncitizen who enters the United States not at a 
port of entry.148 A Presidential Proclamation followed the next day.149 Be-
cause both the rule and the Proclamation act in direct contravention of a 
statute passed by Congress, allowing applicants to seek asylum whether or 
not they have entered at a port of entry,150 the ban has already been chal-
lenged, and blocked, in federal court.151 
The families impacted by the President’s policies, Proclamation, and 
Executive Order are disproportionately migrants and refugees from Cen-
tral America. In 2017, Central Americans made up more than 50% of total 
  
 144. Id.; Lydia Wheeler, ACLU: Separated Parents Were Forced to Sign Paperwork They Can’t 
Read, HILL (July 25, 2018, 5:17 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/news/398873-aclu-separated-par-
ents-were-forced-to-sign-paperwork-they-cant-read. 
 145. ACLU’s Role in Reuniting Separated Families, NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Aug. 4, 
2018, 5:33 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/04/635668333/aclus-role-in-reuniting-separated-fami-
lies. 
 146. Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 15, M.M.M. v. Ses-
sions, No. 18cv1832 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2018). 
 147. Priscilla Alvarez, The Latest Target of Trump’s Immigration Attacks, ATLANTIC (Nov. 1, 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/11/trump-escalates-rhetoric-against-mi-
grant-caravan/574675. 
 148. Aliens Subject to a Bar on Entry Under Certain Presidential Proclamations: Procedures for 
Protection Claims, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,934, 55,934–35 (Nov. 9, 2018) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 
1003, 1208). 
 149. Proclamation No. 9822, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,661 (Nov. 9, 2018). 
 150. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2018). 
 151. Order Granting Preliminary Injunction at 1–2, E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, No. 
18-cv-06810 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2018). 
2019] REPARATIONS FOR REFUGEES 607 
southwest border apprehensions.152 Among unaccompanied minors, Cen-
tral Americans make up roughly 90% of border apprehensions.153 Indeed, 
this Administration has made clear that its policies of detention, family 
separation, and its other attempts at “deterrence”154 are specifically di-
rected toward Central American migrants who have crossed the southern 
U.S.–Mexico border and are seeking asylum.155 
As the struggle to obtain lawful status and protection for these mi-
grants intensifies, what options remain open for them to pursue permanent 
legal status? Do the terms of the ABC Case still protect Salvadorans and 
Guatemalans?156  
The terms of the ABC Case do remain in effect today and are availa-
ble to protect those migrants who meet the above outlined requirements. 
Though negotiated nearly thirty years ago, this agreement may provide a 
pathway to lawful status for, in particular, certain Salvadoran migrants 
who will lose TPS in the coming months.157 The settlement fails, however, 
to offer any kind of meaningful protection to Central American migrants 
who have recently crossed, or will cross, the border fleeing violence in the 
Northern Triangle today. A fuller analysis and evaluation of this potential 
remedy will be explored in Part III of this Article. 
  
 152. Stephanie Leutert, Who’s Really Crossing the U.S. Border, and Why They’re Coming, 
LAWFARE (June 23, 2018, 10:04 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/whos-really-crossing-us-border-
and-why-theyre-coming; see also Southwest Border Migration FY2018, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER 
PROTECTION, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration/fy-2018 (last modified Nov. 
9, 2018) (showing that roughly 90% of migrants are Central American, and UAC/Family Units make 
up about 25% of the total number of apprehensions at the border). The numbers of children and fami-
lies fleeing Guatemala are on pace to double what they have been in recent years. U.S. Border Patrol 
Southwest Border Apprehensions by Sector FY2018, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, 
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/usbp-sw-border-apprehensions (last modified Oct. 23, 2018) 
[hereinafter 2018 Southwest Border Apprehensions]. 
 153. 2018 Southwest Border Apprehensions, supra note 152. 
 154. Rafael Bernal, HHS Official Says Family Separation Policy Will Have ‘Deterrence Effect,’ 
HILL (June 19, 2018, 11:40 AM), https://thehill.com/latino/393000-hhs-official-says-family-separa-
tion-policy-will-have-deterrence-effect. But see Adam Cox & Ryan Goodman, Detention of Migrant 
Families as “Deterrence”: Ethical Flaws and Empirical Doubts, JUST SECURITY (June 22, 2018), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/58354/detention-migrant-families-deterrence-ethical-flaws-empirical-
doubts. 
 155. See, e.g., Trump, supra note 9 (suggesting that immigrants from Central America are com-
ing “to pour into and infest our Country, like MS-13”). 
 156. Specifically, do the terms of the settlement protect (1) those Salvadorans who first entered 
the United States on or before September 19, 1990, and who registered for benefits under the ABC 
Case agreement on or before October 31, 1991, either by applying for asylum or applying for TPS and 
(2) those Guatemalans who first entered the United States on or before October 1, 1990, and who 
registered for benefits under the ABC Case agreement on or before December 31, 1991? American 
Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh (ABC) Settlement Agreement, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
https://www.uscis.gov/laws/legal-settlement-notices/american-baptist-churches-v-thornburgh-abc-
settlement-agreement (last updated Oct. 28, 2008). 
 157. Termination of the Designation of El Salvador for Temporary Protected Status, 83 Fed. 
Reg. 2,654 (Jan. 18, 2018) (ending TPS for Salvadorans). 
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II. U.S. ASYLUM LAW AND THE CHALLENGES FACING NORTHERN 
TRIANGLE REFUGEES 
Refugees of the Northern Triangle today face, in many courts, some-
thing of a sisyphean struggle to obtain asylum with denial rates for these 
cases remaining far higher than for other countries.158 This Part will pro-
vide a brief overview of the history of modern asylum law as well as why 
PSG and nexus requirements have made the path to asylum particularly 
treacherous for Central American migrants. In many ways, the manner in 
which these requirements have developed is just the latest affront in a long 
legacy of animus toward these migrants. 
Asylum allows a noncitizen to remain in the United States temporar-
ily and, usually, permanently, if she can demonstrate that she meets the 
definition of a refugee under the law.159 In the aftermath of World War II, 
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) was 
drafted to establish a worldwide standard for refugee status and protec-
tion.160 Despite not being a signatory to the 1951 Convention, the United 
States later ratified the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
which incorporated the refugee definition set out in the 1951 Conven-
tion.161 
In 1974, the United States first issued regulations setting out asylum 
criteria and guidelines.162 Six years later, as mentioned above, with the 
Refugee Act of 1980,163 asylum received statutory recognition.164 Today, 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines a refugee as: 
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality 
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country 
in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or un-
  
 158. Holly Yan, Which Nationalities Get Rejected the Most for US Asylum?, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/12/world/us-asylum-denial-rates-by-nationality/index.html (last up-
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 159. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208, 8 U.S.C § 1158 (2018); Green Card for Asylees, 
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/greencard/asylees (last updated July 10, 
2017). 
 160. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 56, art. 1 (defining “refugee” 
as a person who, “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nation-
ality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; 
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result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”). 
 161. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. I, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 
U.N.T.S. 267. 
 162. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 52, at 893; see Asylum, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,832 (Dec. 
3, 1974). 
 163. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(b), 94 Stat. 102, 103–05 (1980). 
 164. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2018). 
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willing to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or her-
self of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . .165 
Though present-day Central American migrants can, and often do, 
seek asylum on the basis of other protected grounds,166 this Article will 
focus on the evolution of the PSG and nexus requirements, and the distinct 
challenges they have posed for Central Americans seeking asylum because 
of gang, domestic, and family violence.167  
Of the five bases on which a noncitizen can seek asylum, considera-
ble case law has attempted to tackle the definition of a PSG. As others 
have noted, the term has likely created more debate and controversy than 
any other refugee law term of art.168 Not defined either by the 1951 Con-
vention or by statute or regulations, the evolution of the PSG has been 
solely through case-by-case adjudication.169 The Board first gave meaning 
to PSG in Matter of Acosta,170 a case involving a taxi driver and member 
of a taxi cooperative in El Salvador.171 As a result of his activities, Mr. 
Acosta was beaten by men he believed were leftist guerillas, and his life 
was threatened on three occasions.172 He argued that he feared harm by the 
government for his involvement in a “socialistic” cooperative and from 
the guerillas.173 Mr. Acosta sought asylum as a member of a PSG “com-
prised of COTAXI drivers and persons engaged in the transportation in-
dustry of El Salvador” as well as on account of his political opinion.174 At 
the time of the Board’s opinion in Acosta in 1985, there was little written 
in the way of interpretation of the PSG ground.175 In holding that Mr. 
Acosta was not a member of a PSG, the Board determined that members 
of such a group must share a “common, immutable characteristic” that 
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‘particular social group’ and the determination of what is commonly referred to as ‘nexus,’—the short-
hand term used in the refugee adjudication context to describe the required causal connection between 
persecution and a Convention reason—may be among the most thorny interpretive issues in refugee 
law.”). 
 168. Benjamin Casper et al., Matter of M-E-V-G- and the BIA’s Confounding Legal Standard 
for “Membership in a Particular Social Group,” IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, June 2014, at 3; see DEBORAH 
ANKER, THE LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES §§ 5:40–5:67 (2018). 
 169. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1) (2018); ANKER, supra note 168, § 5.40.  
 170. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 171. Id. at 216–17. 
 172. Id. at 217. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 232. 
 175. See, e.g., GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 48 (2d ed. 1996). 
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members of the group cannot change, or should not be required to change 
because it is “fundamental” to their identity or conscience.176 The Board 
reasoned that because Mr. Acosta could change his job or choose not to 
participate in work stoppages, these characteristics were not immutable.177 
To arrive at such an interpretation, the Board relied on the doctrine of 
ejusdem generis, “of the same kind.”178  
The Board concluded that all protected grounds shared the require-
ment of innate characteristics (race and nationality) or characteristics that 
a respondent should not be required to change (religion and political opin-
ion).179 Thus, the Board held, so too must the PSG ground.180 
Since Acosta, the PSG definition has evolved and changed. Two dec-
ades after Acosta, the Board introduced the criteria of social visibility in 
Matter of C-A-.181 In denying asylum, the Board agreed with the IJ that a 
proposed PSG of “confidential informants . . . against the Cali [drug] car-
tel” failed in part because society did not recognize such a group.182 Later, 
in Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-,183 the Board rejected the proposed PSG of 
“wealthy Guatemalans,” finding that pervasive crime and violence in Gua-
temala meant that such a group lacked social visibility.184  
Today, in addition to the immutability requirement set out in Acosta 
through its decision in Matter of M-E-V-G-,185 the Board has narrowed 
what can constitute a PSG by adding the requirements of “particularity”186 
and “social distinction”187 to the social group formulation. This new defi-
nition precludes large groups of persons from obtaining asylum based on 
size or breadth, “a restriction the Board does not place on the other pro-
tected grounds, that it rejected in Matter of Toboso-Alfonso,188 and which 
has no basis in the INA.”189 Moreover, and as others have articulated, the 
  
 176. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233–34. 
 177. Id. at 234. 
 178. Id. at 233–34. 
 179. Id. at 233–35. 
 180. Id. 
 181. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d, Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 
F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility“ 
in Defining a “Particular Social Group“ and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual 
Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 48, 58 (2008) (discussing the Court’s approach 
in the Acosta case and comparing the approach with the social visibility criteria). 
 182. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960. 
 183. 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007). 
 184. Id. at 76. 
 185. M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 186. Id. at 238 (defining social distinction as, “[W]hether those with a common immutable char-
acteristic are set apart, or distinct, from other persons within the society in some significant way. In 
other words, if the common immutable characteristic were known, those with the characteristic in the 
society in question would be meaningfully distinguished from those who do not have it. A viable 
particular social group should be perceived within the given society as a sufficiently distinct group.”). 
 187. Id. at 239–40 (explaining that particularity requires that the group “be discrete and have 
definable boundaries—it must not be amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective”). 
 188. 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990). 
 189. Casper et al., supra note 168, at 19. 
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new requirements set out in M-E-V-G- create metrics for particularity and 
social visibility that work in opposition to one another.190 These require-
ments are completely out of step with international standards on social 
group protection, principles of treaty interpretation, and the law of other 
countries that are party to international refugee agreements.191 Finally, in 
addition to these legal hurdles and inconsistencies, there are a number of 
practical challenges presented by the evolving PSG standard. Namely, that 
many, if not most, applicants are pro se, forced to navigate complex legal 
and procedural requirements without an attorney as well as to meet a sub-
stantial evidentiary burden on their own.192 The Board has suggested that 
applicants can meet this evidentiary burden by providing “country condi-
tions reports, expert witness testimony, and press accounts of discrimina-
tory laws and policies, historical animosities, and the like.”193 Additional 
hurdles have been put in place even following M-E-V-G-. In January 2018, 
the Board held that “[a]n applicant seeking asylum . . . based on member-
ship in a particular social group must clearly indicate on the record before 
the IJ the exact delineation of any proposed particular social group.”194 As 
former Board member Jeffrey Chase and others have noted,195 this is a tall 
order for experienced asylum attorneys, and all the more so for an asylum 
applicant who may be unrepresented, detained, and non-English speaking. 
As other scholars have pointed out, this shift is both a significant set-
back, and somewhat of a surprise.196 Though not without its detractors,197 
  
 190. See Brief of Amicus Curiae The National Immigrant Justice Center in Support of Petitioner 
at 14, Santos v. Holder, No. 14-1050 (3d Cir. May 29, 2014) (describing this phenomenon). 
 191. Casper et al., supra note 168, at 16. 
 192. Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Hamutal Bernstein, Improving Immigration Adjudications 
Through Competent Counsel, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 58 n.13 (2008) (noting that in a study of 
expedited removal cases, asylum seekers were 12.5 times more likely to be granted relief if represented 
by counsel) (citing Charles H. Kuck, Legal Assistance for Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal: A 
Survey of Alternative Practices, in U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM 
SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL 232, 239 (2005)). Another study found that asylum seekers with 
representation were three times more likely to be granted relief. Id. (citing Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., 
Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 340 (2007)).  
 193. M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 244 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 194. W-Y-C-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 189, 189 (B.I.A. 2018). 
 195. Jeffrey S. Chase, The Impact of the BIA’s Decision in Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 
OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGR. L. (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.jef-
freyschase.com/blog/2018/1/26/0sg8ru1tl0gz4becqimcrtt4ns8yjz. 
 196. See Lindsay M. Harris & Morgan M. Weibel, Matter of S-E-G-: The Final Nail in the Coffin 
for Gang-Related Asylum Claims?, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 5, 28 (2010) (arguing for affirmation 
of the Acosta standard); Rachel Gonzalez Settlage, Rejecting the Children of Violence: Why U.S. Asy-
lum Law Should Return to the Acosta Definition of “A Particular Social Group,” 30 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 287, 297 (2016). 
 197. See Maureen Graves, From Definition to Exploration: Social Groups and Political Asylum 
Eligibility, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 739, 795 (1989) (arguing for a “broad, literal interpretation of ‘so-
cial group’”); Arthur C. Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social Group as a Basis 
for Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 39, 60 (1983) (stating that “membership in virtually 
any group should be sufficient”); see also GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 175, at 47–48; see generally T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff, Protected Characteristics and Social Perceptions: An Analysis of the Meaning 
of ‘Membership of a Particular Social Group,’ in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTANTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 264, 285 (Erika Fuller et al. eds., 
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the Acosta immutability standard was widely accepted for more than two 
decades and adopted by nearly all circuit courts.198 Indeed, the Acosta 
standard was considered to be “a standard that is capable of principled 
evolution but not so vague as to admit persons without a serious basis for 
claims to international protection.”199 As the Eleventh Circuit explained, 
“Acosta strikes an acceptable balance between (1) rendering ‘particular 
social group’ a catch-all for all groups who might claim persecution, which 
would render the other four categories meaningless, and (2) rendering 
‘particular social group’ a nullity by making its requirements too stringent 
or too specific.”200 So too was the Acosta standard incorporated into inter-
national norms and standards, including in guidelines issued by the 
UNHCR.201 Nevertheless, as explained above, this definition was improp-
erly amended and narrowed in M-E-V-G—indeed, the Seventh Circuit in 
particular has all but ignored the criteria laid out in M-E-V-G-, opting in-
stead for the Acosta test.202 
As the term has changed and its interpretation has narrowed over the 
years, new PSGs have been recognized, including those based on gen-
der,203 sexual orientation,204 uncircumcised women,205 family,206 clan 
membership,207 and persons with mental illness,208 among others. But as 
claims for asylum based on membership in a certain PSG have grown, it 
has become increasingly difficult for Central Americans fleeing gang and 
family violence to obtain asylum on these bases.  
  
2003) (resisting an overly broad definition of PSG); Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Ref-
ugee Status Based on Persecution Due to Membership in a Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 505, 543–48 (1993) (discussing the difficulties in defining a social group). 
 198. Lisa Frydman & Neha Desai, Beacon of Hope or Failure of Protection? U.S. Treatment of 
Asylum Claims Based on Persecution by Organized Gangs, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Oct. 2012, at 1, 3, 30 
n.23; Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) (adding “voluntary associational relationship” 
standard). 
 199. JAMES C. HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 427 (2d ed. 
2014). 
 200. Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1197 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 201. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of 
a Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or Its 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 10–13, U.N. Doc. HRC/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002); 
see also Harris & Weibel, supra note 196 (“Affirming the Acosta formulation for social group would 
ensure U.S. conformity with other asylum-receiving countries, such as Canada, New Zealand, and the 
United Kingdom, who have accepted that definition of social group.”). 
 202. Sibanda v. Holder, 778 F.3d 676, 681 (7th Cir. 2015); R.R.D. v. Holder, 746 F.3d 807, 809–
10 (7th Cir. 2014); N.L.A. v. Holder, 744 F.3d 425, 428 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 203. See, e.g., Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2013); Ahmed v. Holder, 611 F.3d 
90, 96 (1st Cir. 2010); Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 204. Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 819–20 (B.I.A. 1990). 
 205. Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 357 (B.I.A. 1996). 
 206. Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 124–25 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that social 
group of family is “paradigmatically immutable”); C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959 (B.I.A. 2006) (“So-
cial groups based on innate characteristics such as sex or family relationship are generally easily rec-
ognizable and understood by others to constitute social groups.”). 
 207. H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337 (B.I.A. 1996). 
 208. Temu v. Holder, 740 F.3d 887, 892–94 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that persons with bipolar 
disorder and erratic behavior may constitute a PSG). 
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A. Domestic Violence and Particular Social Group 
For more than twenty years, noncitizen survivors of domestic vio-
lence have been pushing for recognition as a PSG. Beginning in 1995, the 
case of Rody Alvarado was a litigation battleground. Ms. Alvarado suf-
fered a decade of brutal violence at the hands of her former-soldier hus-
band.209 In fact, she said that her husband’s violence was largely fueled by 
the criminal acts he committed as a member of the Guatemalan military 
and for which he was never punished.210 This sense of impunity persisted. 
Her court documents reveal that “to scare her . . . he would tell her stories 
of having killed babies and the elderly while he served in the army.”211 She 
finally fled Guatemala and sought asylum in the United States.212 The IJ 
granted her asylum, finding that “Guatemalan women who have been in-
volved intimately with Guatemalan male companions who believe that 
women are to live under male domination” constituted a PSG.213 DHS ap-
pealed and the case was litigated for the next ten years, which included 
intervention by the Attorney General.214 Ms. Alvarado finally received 
asylum by stipulation of the parties in 2009, at the same time that the DHS 
conceded via a briefing in a separate case that, in certain instances, domes-
tic violence could be grounds for asylum.215 But it was not until 2014 that 
a precedent decision emerged from the Board holding that women fleeing 
domestic violence, like Ms. Alvarado, can satisfy the refugee definition 
and qualify for asylum in the United States.216  
In that 2014 case, A-R-C-G-, the Board considered the case of Aminta 
Cifuentes. Ms. Cifuentes fled Guatemala after her husband beat her, raped 
her, tried to set her on fire, and hit her so hard in the stomach that she gave 
birth prematurely.217 The Board held that “married women in Guatemala 
who are unable to leave their relationship” can constitute a cognizable PSG 
that forms the basis of a claim for asylum.218 The Board held that gender 
  
 209. R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 908–09 (B.I.A. 1999). 
 210. See id. at 909. 
 211. Redden, supra note 99. 
 212. R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 909. 
 213. Id. at 911. 
 214. Blaine Bookey, Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of 206 Case Out-
comes in the United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 113–17 (2013); Karen 
Musalo et al., Crimes Without Punishment: Violence Against Women in Guatemala, 21 HASTINGS 
WOMEN’S L.J. 161, 162–62 (2010); see also Lisa Frydman, Recent Developments in Domestic-Vio-
lence-Based Asylum Claims, 2009 LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS 4075, https://cgrs.uchas-
tings.edu/sites/default/files/Recent_Developments_in_DV_Asylum_Frydman_08_2009.pdf. 
 215. Department of Homeland Security’s Supplemental Brief at 14, L-R- (B.I.A. Apr. 13, 2009), 
https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-work/matter-l-r, (advancing two formulations of a social group that 
could meet the immutability, visibility, and particularity requirements, including: (1) Mexican women 
in domestic relationships who are unable to leave; or (2) Mexican women who are viewed as property 
by virtue of their position in a domestic relationship). 
 216. A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 
(Att’y Gen. 2018); see also Karen Musalo, Personal Violence, Public Matter: Evolving Standards in 
Gender-Based Asylum Law, HARV. INT’L REV., Fall 2014/Winter 2015, at 45, 45. 
 217. Brief for CGRS to the BIA, CGRS Database Case No. 8767 (B.I.A. Nov. 14, 2012). 
 218. A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 388. 
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is immutable and that marital status, when one party is unable to leave the 
marriage, can similarly be immutable.219 Moreover, the Board held, and 
DHS conceded, that the group was particular—that “married,” “women,” 
and “unable to leave the relationship”—have commonly accepted defini-
tions within Guatemalan society based on the facts in this case, including 
the respondent’s (negative) experience with the police.220 Finally, the 
Board held that this group is socially distinct as Guatemala has a culture 
of “machismo and family violence,” and that Guatemala has laws in place 
to protect survivors of sexual and physical violence but that enforcement 
is problematic and uneven.221 
Unfortunately, despite the Board’s precedent decision in A-R-C-G-, 
relief for survivors of family and domestic violence remained irregular and 
unpredictable. The CGRS evaluated sixty-seven post-A-R-C-G- decisions, 
predominantly involving women from the Northern Triangle of Honduras, 
Guatemala, and El Salvador.222 In that study, a series of patterns emerged 
that highlight the continued challenges these survivors face including: ar-
ticulating cognizable PSGs where partners are unmarried,223 proving that 
a woman is “unable to leave” her relationship, and establishing nexus.224 
Indeed, nexus has become a focal point in PSG claims, where regulations 
and case law require that applicants demonstrate that their persecutor is 
harming them “to overcome a protected ground.”225 While application of 
the A-R-C-G- standard was far from uniform and a lack of clarity persisted, 
it was still understood to be an important step forward to providing the 
protection that survivors of domestic and family violence deserve. 
But, as explained in Part I, this changed in 2018 with the Attorney 
General’s decision A-B-,226 overruling A-R-C-G-. In A-B-, then-Attorney 
General Sessions dismissed claims of gender-based asylum as being wor-
thy of asylum protection, deriding them as “personal, private conflict” and 
  
 219. Id. at 392–93. 
 220. Id. at 393. 
 221. Id. at 394. 
 222. Blaine Bookey, Gender-Based Asylum Post-Matter of A-R-C-G-: Evolving Standards of 
the Law, 22 SW. J. INT’L L. 1, 10–11 (2016). 
 223. But see D-M-R- at 3, CGRS Database Case No. 11564 (B.I.A. June 9, 2015) (Matter of A-
R-C-G- “does not necessarily require that an applicant seeking asylum or withholding of removal 
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 224. Bookey, supra note 222, at 16. 
 225. To establish that the applicant is a refugee, and entitled to asylum, she must establish that a 
protected ground (e.g., membership in a PSG or political opinion) “was or will be at least one central 
reason for persecuting the applicant.” Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2018) (setting forth the nexus standard); INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 
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discussion of the significance of circumstantial evidence of country conditions in cases of gender-
based violence, see Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 662 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 226. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 316 (Att’y Gen. 2018), abrogated by Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. 
Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2018). 
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concluding that “[g]enerally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic vio-
lence or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not 
qualify for asylum.”227  
A-B- highlighted another hurdle for survivors of domestic violence: 
persecution by private actors. And yet, federal courts first recognized that 
private acts—that is, harm by a nongovernment actor—could constitute 
persecution as far back as 1964.228 Since then, all eleven circuit courts have 
agreed.229 In light of this history, the Attorney General’s dismissal of per-
secution by private actors was somewhat startling. Purporting to clarify 
the Attorney General’s decision in A-B-, in July 2018, USCIS issued 
“Guidance for Processing Reasonable Fear, Credible Fear, Asylum, and 
Refugee Claims in Accordance with Matter of A-B-.”230 While this Guid-
ance does not further change the law, it sends a deeply troubling message 
to asylum adjudicators: deny claims of asylum for survivors of domestic 
violence fleeing Central America.231 And the message, clearly, has been 
received, as credible fear approval rates have plummeted in the wake of 
then-Attorney General Sessions’s decision.232 
B. Gang Violence and Particular Social Group 
Survivors of gang violence in Central America have also historically 
faced serious challenges in prevailing in their asylum claims. The first 
published Board case to examine whether fleeing forced gang recruitment 
could constitute a cognizable asylum claim came in 2008 with Matter of 
S-E-G-.233 In S-E-G-, the Board considered the case of the Mira brothers, 
  
 227. Id. at 320, 332. 
 228. Eusaph, 10 I. & N. Dec. 453, 454 (B.I.A. 1964); see also Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 679 
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243(h) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970)); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Immigration Law 
Professors at 2–20, A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (Att’y Gen. 2018). 
 230. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 128, at 1. 
 231. Id. at 5 (citing A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337–38, 343–44) (“The mere fact that a country has 
civil strife or anarchy resulting in displaced persons or that it has problems effectively policing certain 
crimes, like domestic violence or gang-related activities, or that certain populations are or are more 
likely to become victims of crimes or violence, cannot, by itself, establish eligibility for asylum or 
refugee status.”). 
 232. Tal Kopan, Impact of Sessions’ Asylum Move Already Felt at Border, CNN (July 14, 2018, 
8:09 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/14/politics/sessions-asylum-impact-border/index.html. 
 233. 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 579 (B.I.A. 2008). A companion case to S-E-G- was also published on 
July 30, 2008. E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 591 (B.I.A. 2008) (holding that “persons resistant to gang 
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who are perceived to be affiliated with gangs” was not a social group because actual membership in a 
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Pablo, Rene, and Silva, who all fled El Salvador after they were beaten 
and threatened by MS-13, who pressured them to join the gang.234 When 
they refused, the gang also threatened to rape their older sister.235 They 
declined to report the attacks as they did not believe the police could pro-
tect them, and they feared retaliation.236 
The IJ found the brothers credible but denied them asylum, finding 
that they had not established nexus either to membership in a PSG or to a 
political opinion.237 The IJ held that the beatings and threats occurred 
simply because the gang wished to recruit new members, and the brothers 
had not suffered past persecution.238 Moreover, the IJ found that the broth-
ers failed to show that the Salvadoran government was unwilling or unable 
to control criminal street gangs.239 
Specifically, in considering the brothers’ proposed social group of 
“Salvadoran youth who have been subjected to recruitment efforts by the 
MS-13 gang and who have rejected or resisted membership in the gang 
based on their own personal, moral, and religious opposition to the gang’s 
values and activities,” the Board found the group lacking in both particu-
larity and social visibility240 (now social distinction).241 
The years that have followed S-E-G- have not been promising for the 
children and adults fleeing pervasive gang violence in Central America. 
Cognizable PSGs for this community have been routinely denied, and 
alongside these denials, the asylum officer training manual was amended 
to include guidance instructing that officers should deny claims unless the 
applicant can “demonstrate a substantial and realistic possibility of suc-
ceeding.”242 With PSG claims being denied, the possibility of succeeding 
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visibility,” and renaming that element as “social distinction”). 
 242. Casper et al., supra note 168, at 24; see Immigration and Nationality Act 
§ 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(v) (2018) (defining “credible fear of persecution” 
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show that he or she is more likely than not going to succeed when before an immigration judge” 
(quoting Memorandum from Joseph E. Langlois, Asylum Div., Office of Int’l Affairs, on Increase of 
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in these types of cases becomes less and less of a “substantial and realistic 
possibility.”243 This one-two punch has been harrowing for Central Amer-
icans fleeing gang violence in Central America.  
The same year that S-E-G- was decided, nonconfidential informants 
testifying against gang members in El Salvador244 and young men in El 
Salvador resisting gang violence245 were also rejected as PSGs. And even 
after M-E-V-G-, in a perhaps misguided effort, the Board clarified that 
“social visibility” did not mean “ocular” or literal visibility, and renamed 
the element “social distinction.” Gang cases still proved difficult. In 2014, 
the Board held that “former members of the Mara 18 gang in El Salvador 
who have renounced their gang membership” are not a PSG.246 That same 
year, the Eighth Circuit rejected the claim of young Guatemalan men who 
had been beaten and extorted by the gangs, had opposed MS-13, and had 
faced retaliation as a result of reporting their attacks.247 In 2015, the First 
Circuit held that “Guatemalan citizens who do not sport gang colors and 
tattoos” was “too amorphous and overbroad to be particular.”248 The Sixth 
Circuit then found that neither “El Salvadoran male youth, who were 
forced to actively participate in violent gang activities for the majority of 
their youth and who refused to comply with demands to show their loyalty 
through increasing violence” or, alternatively, “active and long-term for-
mer gang members” constituted a cognizable PSG, as they both lacked 
social distinction.249 
Of course, there have been some glimmers of hope for certain groups 
in certain circuits. Uniformity has never been a place where the asylum 
system has excelled, and that is true too for those fleeing gang violence.250 
However, there have been some recent, positive decisions where district 
courts have held that witnesses and family members of witnesses are cog-
nizable PSGs in gang-based asylum claims.251 Using the well-established 
  
Quality Assurance Review for Positive Credible Fear Determinations and Release of Updated Asylum 
Officer Basic Training Course Lesson Plan, Credible Fear of Persecution and Torture Determinations, 
to Asylum Office Directors et al. (Apr. 17, 2006))); Memorandum from John Lafferty, Chief, Asylum 
Div., on Release of Updated Asylum Division Officer Training Course Lesson Plan, Credible Fear of 
Persecution and Torture Determinations, to Asylum Office Directors et al. 2 (Feb. 28, 2014) (describ-
ing the major changes to CREDIBLE FEAR LESSON PLAN, supra). 
 243. See supra note 242. 
 244. Amilcar-Orellana v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 86, 87–88, 91 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that this 
PSG lacked social visibility). 
 245. Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 744–46 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 246. W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 221 (B.I.A. 2014), vacated in part on other grounds by Reyes 
v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 247. Garcia v. Holder, 746 F.3d 869, 871–73 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 248. Paiz-Morales v. Lynch, 795 F.3d 238, 244 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 249. Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 491, 498–99 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 250. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 192, at 372–77. 
 251. See, e.g., Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1092 (9th Cir. 2013); Crespin-Val-
ladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 124–26 (4th Cir. 2011). But see Zelaya v. Holder, 668 F.3d 159, 166–
67 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that while family members of witnesses formed a PSG, witnesses them-
selves did not). 
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“family” as a PSG has also had modest success.252 As well, at least three 
circuits have held that former gang members can constitute a PSG as such 
a characteristic is immutable because former gang membership cannot be 
“cast off.”253 Finally, some women and girls have succeeded in claims ar-
guing that they were persecuted as members of the PSG of “Salvadoran 
women who are viewed as gang property” and similar “gang-girlfriend” 
type claims.254 
The challenges of formulating a cognizable PSG, proving nexus, ar-
guing persecution by private actors, and state protection issues have 
formed the perfect storm for the death of many gang-based asylum claims. 
While many have theorized, convincingly, how and why these hurdles 
should not spell denial for Central American claimants fleeing gang vio-
lence,255 the reality on the ground is quite different. Across the southern 
border and into the northeast and northwest of the United States, refugees 
fleeing devastating violence in Central America will be systematically de-
nied protection as a direct result of this constellation of inflexible, and in-
consistent, decisions and policies. 
III. SOLUTIONS TO ENSURE THE RIGHTS OF CENTRAL AMERICAN 
ASYLUM SEEKERS ARE PROTECTED 
Traditional avenues to protection and relief for Central Americans 
fleeing harm and persecution are systematically being winnowed by this 
Administration; reminiscent of the 1980s and 1990s, transparent discrim-
ination and animus toward migrants from Central America abounds.256 
This Part explores possible solutions to protect the rights of these belea-
guered refugees. First, this Part considers the possibility of humanitarian 
asylum. Could humanitarian asylum be expanded or reimagined to meet 
the needs of this group of migrants? Next, this Part entertains the possible 
extension or expansion of TPS for Northern Triangle migrants. This Part 
considers the temporary nature of this status and its vulnerability to the 
changing political winds. Thereafter, this Part evaluates the potential for a 
modern-day ABC Case and the increasing limitations on such class actions 
for noncitizens. Finally, in light of the limitations of the aforementioned 
  
 252. L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 42–43 (B.I.A. 2017). The recent certification of this case by 
the Attorney General, L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 494 (2018), raises questions as to the continued viability 
of this group. 
 253. Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 911–13 (4th Cir. 2014); Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 
F.3d 360, 365–67 (6th Cir. 2010); Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 429 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 254. See, e.g., Memorandum of Decision and Order 5–6, 16, 18 (May 2, 2011), http://loui-
setrauma.weebly.com/uploads/1/1/3/5/113529125/ij-5-2-11.pdf (granting asylum to a Salvadoran 
woman who was raped, stalked, and threatened repeatedly by 18th Street gang members who referred 
to her as their “woman” and their “property”). 
 255. See, e.g., NANCY KELLY & JOHN WILLSHIRE CARRERA, A “CHILD-CENTERED APPROACH” 
TO ASYLUM CLAIMS OF CHILDREN FLEEING THE CENTRAL AMERICAN TRIANGLE 1–2, 4–5, 
https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/indigenous/files/child_centered_approach_-_willshire.pdf (pre-
senting an excellent manual for approaching gang-based asylum claims of children, focusing on issues 
of PSG formulation, lack of state protection, and nexus). 
 256. Roberto Suro, Opinion, We Need to Offer More than Asylum, NY TIMES, (July 14, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/14/opinion/sunday/migration-asylum-trump.html. 
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potential solutions, this Part argues that congressional action is necessary 
to right the historic and modern-day wrongs faced by Central American 
refugees—wrongs that the U.S. government created and perpetuated. 
A. Humanitarian Asylum 
Can an often neglected, overlooked, and misunderstood path to pro-
tection, called “humanitarian asylum,” provide the kind of relief that 
Northern Triangle refugees like William, the child fleeing gang violence 
introduced at the beginning of this Article, need? 
Traditional applicants for asylum fall into one of two categories: (1) 
those who have experienced past persecution and who continue to have a 
well-founded fear of future persecution, and (2) those who, despite not 
having suffered past persecution, have a well-founded fear of future per-
secution in their home country.257 By regulation, when an applicant estab-
lishes past persecution, it gives rise to the presumption of a well-founded 
fear of future persecution and the burden then shifts to the DHS to rebut 
that presumption.258 However a third, and often overlooked pathway to 
asylum exists for those applicants who do not have a well-founded fear of 
persecution but who nonetheless merit protection. These applicants can 
also be broken down into two categories: (1) those who have demonstrated 
“compelling reasons” for being unwilling or unable to return to their coun-
try, arising out of the severity of the past persecution,259 and (2) those who 
have established that they may suffer “other serious harm” upon removal 
to that country.260 Notably, as a threshold matter, to qualify for either form 
of humanitarian asylum, an applicant must establish that she falls into the 
category of a refugee and has experienced past persecution on account of 
one of the five protected grounds outlined in the statute.261  
The former pathway toward humanitarian asylum, based on the se-
verity of past persecution alone, was an idea first introduced following 
World War II, and originally intended to provide protection and safe haven 
to Holocaust survivors.262 At that time, the United Nations developed a 
framework263 to provide protection to refugees fleeing persecution, includ-
ing those who suffered severe past persecution but had no fear of future 
persecution.264 Though initially only applicable to pre-1951 refugees, the 
  
 257. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (2018) (describing eligibility for asylum). 
 258. D-I-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 448, 450 (B.I.A. 2008); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). 
 259. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A). 
 260. Id. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B). 
 261. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 101(a)(42)(A), 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 
1158(a)(1) (2006); see also Hamida v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 734, 740–41 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 262. KAREN MUSALO ET AL., REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE AND 
INTERNATIONAL APPROACH 481 (2d ed. 2002). 
 263. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 56, art. 1. 
 264. Id. art. 1(C)(5) (creating an exception to the Convention’s cessation provisions for a refugee 
“who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail 
himself of the protection of the country of nationality”). 
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framework has since been expanded to cover any refugees who have suf-
fered severe or atrocious forms of past persecution.265  
U.S. regulations first included this particular pathway to asylum in 
1990, following the BIA decision in Matter of Chen.266 In Chen, the Board 
explained that it was “clear from the plain language of the statute that past 
persecution can be the basis for a persecution claim, and the case law has 
acknowledged this, if not focused on it.”267 The Board granted humanitar-
ian asylum on this basis.268 
Until 2001, the availability of humanitarian asylum began and ended 
with Chen and its progeny.269 But in January 2001, § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B) 
was promulgated, opening up a second pathway toward humanitarian asy-
lum. As the Attorney General explained, “The Department recognizes . . . 
that the existing regulation may represent an overly restrictive approach to 
the exercise of discretion in cases involving past persecution, but no well-
founded fear of future persecution.”270 And, it appears, that the “other se-
rious harm” prong of humanitarian asylum may have also been added to 
bring the regulations into conformity with the provisions of the UNHCR’s 
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, 
which, though not binding on the U.S. government, provided “significant 
guidance” and served as an “interpretative aid.”271 In the proposed rule at 
the time, the Attorney General took pains to avoid spelling out what ex-
actly would constitute “other serious harm” sufficient for a grant of hu-
manitarian asylum. The only guidance provided was that the harm would 
have to be “so ‘serious’ as to equal the severity of persecution” though it 
need not be on account of one of the five protected grounds.272  
  
 265. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A) (noting that an applicant may be granted asylum in the ab-
sence of a well-founded fear of persecution if “[t]he applicant has demonstrated compelling reasons 
for being unwilling or unable to return to the country arising out of the severity of the past persecu-
tion”); United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and 
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, ¶ 136, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (reissued 2011) (“It 
is frequently recognized that a person who—or whose family—has suffered under atrocious forms of 
persecution should not be expected to repatriate.”). 
 266. See Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 18–20 (B.I.A. 1989) (Chen, the son of a Christian preacher, 
was subject to brutal house arrest, interrogation, physical abuse, and food deprivation as a child at the 
hands of the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution in China); Aliens and Nationality; Asylum 
and Withholding of Deportation Procedures, 55 Fed. Reg. 30,674, 30,683 (July 27, 1990) (codified at 
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(ii)). 
 267. See Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 729 (9th Cir. 1988); Blanco-Comarribas v. INS, 830 F.2d 
1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 1987). But cf. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440–41 (1987). 
 268. Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 21. 
 269. See, e.g., N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 312, 319–20 (B.I.A. 1998); H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 
346–47 (B.I.A. 1996); B-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 66, 72 (B.I.A. 1995). 
 270. Executive Office for Immigration Review; New Rules Regarding Procedures for Asylum 
and Withholding of Removal, 63 Fed. Reg. 31, 945, 31,947 (proposed June 11, 1998). 
 271. See Asylum Procedures, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,121, 76,127 (Dec. 6, 2000). 
 272. Executive Office for Immigration Review; New Rules Regarding Procedures for Asylum 
and Withholding of Removal, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,945, 31,947 (proposed June 11, 1998). The Attorney 
General did provide some minimal guidance on what would not qualify—namely, “mere economic 
disadvantage or the inability to practice one’s chosen profession.” Id. 
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In 2012, the Board provided a bit more clarity on the factors to con-
sider in assessing claims for relief on “other serious harm” grounds.273 
These factors include current conditions that could severely affect the ap-
plicant, such as civil strife and extreme economic deprivation; and physi-
cal or psychological harm that the applicant might suffer if removed.274 
The Board emphasized that “other serious harm” can be generalized and 
that adjudicators should “pay particular attention to major problems that 
large segments of the population [could] face.”275  
Though now clearly articulated in the statute and regulations, both of 
these forms of humanitarian asylum are underused by practitioners and 
applicants, and routinely misconstrued by adjudicators.276 Indeed, some 
circuit courts have treated Chen as a minimum threshold—that is, that the 
facts of the case must be as severe as those in Chen, or worse, to merit a 
grant of asylum—while other courts have failed to set a discernible stand-
ard altogether or created their own criteria.277 In 2011, the First Circuit 
noted dismissively, “[I]t can hardly be expected that every case should 
entail a detailed discussion of a last-resort form of relief that is difficult to 
obtain and rarely granted.”278  
  
 273. L-S-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 705, 714 (B.I.A. 2012). 
 274. Id. at 713–14. 
 275. Id. at 714. 
 276. See, e.g., Zongxun Jiang v. Holder, 487 F. App’x 655, 657 (2d Cir. 2012) (remanding where 
the agency failed to consider whether the respondent had established a reasonable possibility of other 
serious harm in China); see also Bello v. Holder, 480 F. App’x 646, 648 (2d Cir. 2012) (upholding 
denial of humanitarian asylum and yet noting that the IJ and BIA “did not expressly discuss whether 
Bello would suffer ‘other serious harm’ upon return to the Central African Republic”); Kone v. Holder, 
596 F.3d 141, 151–52 (2d Cir. 2010) (remanding the case and indicating that the parties had over-
looked the possibility of a humanitarian asylum claim in a female genital cutting claim). But see, e.g., 
Ordonez-Quino v. Holder, 760 F.3d 80, 93 (1st Cir. 2014) (discussing thoroughly humanitarian asylum 
based on the severity of past persecution suffered); Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 801 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (recognizing female genital mutilation as “a particularly severe form of past persecution 
because of its many continuing effects”). 
 277. See, e.g., Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 184–86, 190 (4th Cir. 2004) (describing facts 
where respondent was arrested, held in a cell that was routinely flooded with water up to his chest, 
could not eat or sleep, experienced hallucinations and was held in solitary confinement for several 
months. The court denied asylum, because the persecution was less severe than that in Chen). But see 
Rodriguez-Matamoras v. INS, 86 F.3d 158, 161 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that Chen does not set the 
minimum threshold for a grant on this basis); see also Pergega-Gjonaj v. Gonzales, 128 F. App’x 507, 
509, 512–13 (6th Cir. 2005) (denying both kinds of humanitarian asylum to ethnic Albanians, a father 
and son, from the former Yugoslavia who were forced to work in a labor camp in abysmal conditions, 
and whose relative was murdered in front of them); Amadu v. Ashcroft, 84 F. App’x 711, 712 (8th 
Cir. 2003) (quoting Francois v. INS, 283 F.3d 926, 932 (8th Cir. 2002)) (denying asylum to Ghanaian 
tespondent who was cut and stabbed on account of his political opinion); Lal v. INS, 255 F.3d 998, 
1005 (2001) (reviewing BIA precedent and holding that permanent disability, as in Chen, is not a 
requirement for eligibility for humanitarian asylum); Gonahasa v. INS, 181 F.3d 538, 540 (4th Cir. 
1999) (denying asylum but failing to articulate a standard by which to measure the severity or degree 
of harm suffered). 
 278. Precetaj v. Holder, 649 F.3d 72, 78 (1st Cir. 2011). 
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On one hand, theoretically and philosophically, there is robust sup-
port for an expansion of the definition of humanitarian asylum and a re-
consideration of the narrow definition of a refugee.279 In particular, con-
sistent with the Convention refugee definition, humanitarian asylum 
should be expanded to include those who need protection from serious 
harm, regardless of the source of the harm. Historically, asylum was de-
signed to solve a particular problem in a particular political moment—the 
crisis faced by post-World War II European refugees—and “was not a 
model for general application.”280 Humanitarian asylum was later included 
specifically in response to the harms and violence faced by anti-com-
munist activists and religious minorities during the Cultural Revolution in 
China.281 Asylum has been politically and ideologically driven by very 
specific moments in the history of our country and our world.282 Indeed, 
asylum law and legislation has, in some ways, been responsive to the needs 
of a changing political and socioeconomic landscape.283 And yet, a reimag-
ining of humanitarian asylum would still pose some of the very same chal-
lenges as traditional pathways to asylum for Central American refugees. 
For one, it would still require an applicant to establish past persecu-
tion as a threshold hurdle. As courts have been unwilling to find past per-
secution in even egregious cases of harm by gang members and domestic 
partners, this hurdle would remain formidable despite humanitarian asy-
lum’s other protections. Next, the source of the harm would still prove 
problematic. It is long established that both government actors and non-
government actors can be the source of harm in a cognizable claim for 
asylum.284 In fact, the BIA285 as well as all eleven federal circuit courts to 
  
 279. See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 199, at 17; Peter Singer & Renata Singer, The Ethics 
of Refugee Policy, in OPEN BORDERS? CLOSED SOCIETIES?: THE ETHICAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES 111, 
121, 128–29 (Mark Gibney ed., 1988); ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG ET AL., ESCAPE FROM VIOLENCE: 
CONFLICT AND THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 3–5 (1989); Andrew E. Shacknove, 
Who Is a Refugee?, 95 ETHICS 274, 278, 284 (1985). 
 280. Gervase Coles, Approaching the Refugee Problem Today, in REFUGEES AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 373, 374 (Gil Loescher & Laila Monahan eds., 1989). 
 281. Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 21 (B.I.A. 1989). 
 282. HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 199, at 133–35. 
 283. See Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, tit. II, 
111 Stat. 2160, 2193–2201 (1997) (providing statutory relief when number of asylees overwhelmed 
the asylum process); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, Div. C, § 601(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-689 (making Republic of China’s enforce-
ment of one-child policy grounds for political opinion asylum claim); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub 
L. No. 101-649, §§ 302–303, 104 Stat. 4,978, 5030–38 (establishing TPS and special TPS for Salva-
dorans in response to refugee crisis); Exec. Order No. 12,711, 55 Fed. Reg. 13,897 (1990) (establishing 
Deferred Enforced Departure for Chinese nationals in wake of Tiananmen Square Massacre). 
 284. Eusaph, 10 I. & N. Dec. 453, 454–55 (B.I.A. 1964) (first suggesting that private acts that a 
government was unable or unwilling to control could constitute persecution); see also Joseph H. 
Carens, Who Should Get in? The Ethics of Immigration Admissions, 17 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 95, 103 
(2003) [hereinafter Carens, Who Should Get in?] (“From a moral perspective, the great weakness of 
the definition is that it can be construed so narrowly that it excludes people from refugee status who 
clearly have fled in fear of their lives and need external assistance. . . . [W]hat should matter the most 
is the seriousness of the danger and the extent of the risk, not the source of the threat or the motivation 
behind it. So, in principle, the definition should be revised to reflect this wider perspective.”). 
 285. See, e.g., Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996). 
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have considered the question have held that persecution may be by private 
actors whom the government is either unable or unwilling to control.286 
However, in light of the Attorney General’s decision in A-B-, which ap-
pears transparently directed at survivors of domestic and gang violence 
fleeing the Northern Triangle,287 doubt (false and erroneous) has emerged 
over whether harm by private nongovernment actors can constitute perse-
cution.288 Finally, nexus could persist as an obstacle. As aforementioned, 
one requirement of being granted asylum is that the applicant demonstrate 
that she was persecuted “on account of” one of the five protected grounds. 
This causation or nexus requirement asks, “is the persecution inflicted to 
punish the applicant for possessing a belief or characteristic that the per-
secutor seeks to overcome?”289 
Because courts have historically challenged nexus requirements in 
gang and family violence cases,290 humanitarian asylum may also fall short 
in this arena. 
B. Temporary Protected Status  
Congress created TPS in 1990.291 TPS allows the Secretary of Home-
land Security to designate a foreign state or part of a foreign state where it 
was not currently safe for individuals to return home in any of three cir-
cumstances: (a) ongoing armed conflict; (b) an environmental disaster; or 
(c) where “extraordinary and temporary conditions” prevent safe return 
and allowing the state’s nationals to remain in the United States would not 
be contrary to the national interest.292 In so doing, the statute creates clear 
criteria and procedures in lieu of the more ad hoc procedures previously 
used by the executive branch to provide relief. 
  
 286. See Malu v. Att’y Gen., 764 F.3d 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2014); Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 
191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014); R.R.D. v. Holder, 746 F.3d 807, 809 (7th Cir. 2014); Constanza-Martinez v. 
Holder, 739 F.3d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir. 2014); Doe v. Holder, 736 F.3d 871, 877–78 (9th Cir. 2013); 
Karki v. Holder, 715 F.3d 792, 801 (10th Cir. 2013); Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 503 (3d Cir. 
2011); Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 128 (4th Cir. 2011); Kante v. Holder, 634 F.3d 
321, 325 (6th Cir. 2011); Tesfamichael v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 2006); Pierre, 15 I. 
& N. Dec. 461, 462 (B.I.A. 1975) (formalizing the “unwilling or unable” to control standard for non-
governmental persecution in the context of a claim made under former section 243(h) of the INA, 8 
U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970)); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Immigration Law Professors at 1, A-B-, 27 
I. & N. Dec. 316 (Att’y Gen. 2018), https://uchas-
tings.app.box.com/s/tt1ydliq5ttm1i2zxlz4rname4bk29s7/file/291245799324. 
 287. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320 (“Generally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence 
or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for asylum.”). 
 288. See id. (attempting to elevate the government unwillingness or inability to protect standard 
to condone andcomplete helplessness). 
 289. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part on other grounds by 
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987). 
 290. See, e.g., Martinez-Martinez v. Sessions, 743 F. App’x 629, 632–33 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding 
applicant could not show nexus between harm by MS gang and the social group of “married women 
in Honduras who are unable to leave their relationship”); Guerra-Marchorro v. Holder, 760 F.3d 126, 
128–29 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding that applicant could not show nexus between harm by MS gang and 
the social group of abandoned Guatemalan children). 
 291. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub L. No. 101-649, §§ 302, 303, 104 Stat. 4,978, 5030–38. 
 292. Immigration and Nationality Act § 244A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1) (2018). 
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The Secretary of Homeland Security may issue TPS for periods of 
six to eighteen months.293 Periodically thereafter, the Secretary is tasked 
with reviewing the conditions in the designated country to determine 
whether conditions have changed or whether continued designation as a 
TPS-eligible country is appropriate.294 If the latter, the Secretary may then 
redesignate a country, or the period of designation may be extended for up 
to eighteen months. There is no statutory limit on how many times TPS 
may be extended.295 Whatever the Secretary’s decision, it must be pub-
lished in the Federal Register to provide ample notice to TPS beneficiaries 
who depend on this designation for work authorization, among others. 
Since then, TPS designations have varied, with some countries des-
ignated for brief periods of time while others have received over a decade 
of designation due to ongoing war, disaster, or other extraordinary condi-
tions.296 Currently, more than 400,000 individuals from ten different coun-
tries have TPS.297 Among them are 242,900 Salvadoran TPS recipients298 
and 57,000 Honduran TPS recipients currently in the United States.299 
Across the United States, more than 270,000 U.S. citizen children have at 
least one parent with TPS.300 
Notably, in the past, in considering whether to redesignate or extend 
TPS, the Secretary had considered intervening events in the country of 
designation—whether environmental disaster or social or economic crisis 
had occurred after the initial designation. But after President Trump took 
office, DHS—without any formal announcement or other explanation—
adopted a “new, novel interpretation of the TPS statute that eschews con-
sideration of any intervening country conditions.”301 This “new, novel” in-
terpretation is presently being challenged on multiple fronts.302 
  
 293. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(2)(B). 
 294. Id. § 1254a(b)(3)(A). 
 295. Id. § 1254a(b)(3)(C). 
 296. See, e.g., 75 Fed. Reg. 3,476 (Jan. 21, 2010) (designating Haiti under TPS program); 66 
Fed. Reg. 14,214 (Mar. 9, 2001) (designating El Salvador under TPS program); 64 Fed. Reg. 526 (Jan. 
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 297. Class Action Complaint at 2, Ramos v. Nielsen, No. 3:18-cv-1554 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 
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Indeed, as explained in Part I, TPS will soon be ending for Central 
American migrants. El Salvador was the first country to receive TPS des-
ignation. While El Salvador remains one of the countries most in need of 
TPS’s continuance, that country’s designation will expire on September 9, 
2019.303 Similarly, TPS for Hondurans will terminate on January 5, 
2020.304 
In response to the termination of TPS, a number of organizations and 
plaintiffs have filed suit. Their allegations range from violations of the 
rights of U.S. citizens with TPS holding parents305 to alleging that in end-
ing TPS, DHS has violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses 
of the Fifth Amendment.306 Federal District Judge Casper, in allowing one 
suit to proceed in Boston, held “that the combination of a disparate impact 
on particular racial groups, statements of animus by people plausibly al-
leged to be involved in the decision-making process, and an allegedly un-
reasoned shift in policy” were sufficient to suggest the policy shift was 
motivated by discriminatory purposes.307  
Could a continuation or expansion of TPS right the wrongs with re-
gards to the protection of Central American refugees? Surely the ongoing, 
pervasive violence in Central America, and Central American govern-
ments’ inability to protect their citizens from harm, presents the kind of 
extraordinary conditions contemplated by the creators of TPS. Unfortu-
nately, however, this Administration has not shown the political will to 
continue, let alone expand, TPS protections for this group of migrants. 
And while we will not always have this President, TPS as a permanent 
solution still comes up short. TPS was not created to provide protection 
for refugees—that is the role of the asylum statute and Refugee Conven-
tion. Moreover, TPS does not provide a pathway to permanent immigra-
tion status. While work authorization and the rights and benefits attendant 
to such status—is meaningful and important, it provides neither the long-
term stability nor the political power of permanent lawful status. There is 
no doubt that TPS has provided critical protection and relief to hundreds 
of thousands of noncitizens whose return to their home countries could not 
be accomplished safely; but this Article argues that we can, and should, do 
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more for noncitizens fleeing harm and persecution from the Northern Tri-
angle. 
C. A Modern-Day ABC Case 
Alternately, advocates could return to the language of the ABC Case 
agreement—the principles outlined there are instructive and indicative of 
lessons unlearned by recent administrations and the U.S. government 
agencies who carry out our immigration laws. Namely, advocates should 
begin from the premise that “foreign policy and border enforcement con-
siderations are not relevant to the determination of whether an applicant 
for asylum has a well-founded fear of persecution” and that “the same 
standard for determining whether or not an applicant has a well-founded 
fear of persecution applies” to Central Americans as applies to all other 
nationalities.308 Indeed, these principles continue to govern—at least in 
theory—asylum adjudications today.309 But, as we have seen, this is not 
enough to protect the rights of Central American refugees. Should advo-
cates pursue a new lawsuit to ameliorate the devastating impact of the dis-
crimination, animus, and disproportionate case denials faced by this com-
munity? Would another lawsuit be feasible? If so, would it provide suffi-
cient remedies? 
On the heels of the Attorney General’s decision in A-B- and subse-
quently issued new credible fear guidance, the ACLU and the CGRS filed 
suit in federal court.310 They argued that the new policies violated the INA, 
the Refugee Act, the Administrative Procedures Act, Separation of Pow-
ers, and Due Process.311 Their prayer for relief, though not a perfect ABC 
Case, provides powerful potential language for a modern-day ABC 
Case.312 Inter alia, the complaint seeks a declaration by the court that the 
new credible fear policies are contrary to law, and that orders should be 
entered vacating the policies and enjoining defendants from continuing to 
apply them.313 Moreover, the complaint seeks to stay the expedited re-
moval of all plaintiffs (or vacate expedited removal orders if such exist), 
and enjoin defendants from removing plaintiffs without providing them a 
new credible fear process under the correct legal standard or a full removal 
hearing.314 There is no doubt that, if granted, the relief sought in this case 
would be significant, and have a dramatic positive impact on the named 
plaintiffs. 
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The legal action taken in this case feels both acutely necessary and 
also only one piece of a larger puzzle. Lawsuits and litigation yielded an 
exceedingly positive result for Central American beneficiaries of the ABC 
Case and yet, profound discrimination and bias remains in the adjudication 
of Central American asylum claims. 
Further, there may be procedural hurdles in pursuing such a class ac-
tion. Today, unlike the climate at the time of the ABC Case, there is in-
creasing hostility to large-scale class actions in the immigration context. 
As Jill Family, Leti Volpp, Hiroshi Motomura, and Gerald Neuman have 
explained, since 1996 there has been an increasing erosion of the relative 
availability of judicial review in immigration matters.315 Family articulates 
three specific threats to class actions in the immigration context: “(1) [A] 
general congressional willingness to restrict immigration judicial review; 
(2) the application of waivers of judicial review to immigration law; and 
(3) legislative jurisdiction-stripping attacks more specific to the immigra-
tion class action.”316 Citing the ABC Case class action as one example, 
Family chronicles the history of class action lawsuits in the immigration 
context to protect due process rights,317 challenge immigration detention 
procedures,318 and even to advance systemic reform,319 among other 
changes. Most recently, in Jennings v. Rodriguez,320 the Supreme Court, 
in considering the question whether the government can indefinitely detain 
noncitizens without a bond hearing, also confronted these questions re-
garding judicial review.321 Justice Alito, writing for the majority, invited 
the Ninth Circuit to consider whether plaintiffs can bring any claim at all 
for their alleged due process violations.322 This troubling invitation, if ex-
tended, would call into question class action litigation of constitutional 
claims—the likes of which have been permitted and widely used in immi-
gration and other contexts since the civil rights era.323 
A class action alone may be insufficient to remedy the wrongs faced 
by Central American asylum seekers. There is no doubt that the ABC Case 
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was monumental—affecting more than 500,000 class members, the settle-
ment provided bona fide refugees who had been previously prejudiced a 
de novo asylum interview, work authorization, stays of deportation, ad-
ministrative closure of pending cases, and limits on the detention of class 
members.324 But notwithstanding the ABC Case and others like it,325 and 
despite the principles outlined there, this Article argues that the ample and 
unrelenting bias that remains in the adjudication of Central American asy-
lum claims requires something more: congressional intervention. 
D. Congressional Intervention  
In 1997, on the heels of devastating and draconian immigration re-
form and some partial improvements in country conditions in Central 
America, ABC Case class members were hit hard. Though some obtained 
TPS status, many of their asylum cases had yet to be adjudicated and, 
where they once had bona fide claims for asylum, the end of civil wars in 
Central America meant that their claims were no longer strong in the eyes 
of the immigration agency. Meanwhile, the immigration reform of 1996 
eliminated a form of relief—“suspension of deportation”—that may have 
provided many of them relief if faced with removal.326 In light of this con-
stellation of events that left many ABC Case class members in a precarious 
legal state, Congress was poised to act, though not without a pitched po-
litical fight. What ultimately became known as the Nicaraguan Adjustment 
and Central American Relief Act (NACARA),327 was originally sent to 
Congress by President Clinton framed as legislation to help Salvadorans, 
Guatemalans, and Nicaraguans make use of the now-defunct suspension 
of deportation.328 Following fierce debate and competing proposals by 
Congressman Lamar Smith (R-FL) and Senator Edward Kennedy (D-
MA), what came out the other side was entirely different. The legislation 
that ultimately passed set up a two-tiered system of relief. In one category 
were Cubans and Nicaraguans who entered the country before December 
1, 1995—often having fled leftist governments the United States had op-
posed—who were able to apply immediately for lawful permanent resi-
dence.329 The second, less favorable though still important, category was 
occupied by Salvadorans and Guatemalans, most of whom had fled gov-
ernments the United States had supported, and who faced tougher stand-
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ards and only the ability to pursue lawful permanent residence in immi-
gration court—where the stakes are higher and the outcome less certain.330 
In fact, former President Clinton, acknowledging the double standard, 
called unsuccessfully on the DOJ to issue regulations that would dampen 
the disparity.331 Despite its shortcomings, NACARA has provided im-
portant and meaningful relief—and a pathway to lawful permanent resi-
dence and ultimately, citizenship—for many noncitizens. NACARA’s his-
tory and conception provides a blueprint for legislative possibility; Con-
gress can act to curb, or even cure, inequity. Congress can carve out legis-
lation meant to right the wrongs faced by particular groups of migrants in 
need of protection. 
This approach is not new; past Congresses and Administrations have 
enacted one-off pathways to relief for specific groups of migrants.332 In 
particular, they have done so in instances where the U.S. government has 
been instrumental in creating the peril or exposing certain groups of mi-
grants to discrimination and harm, including in the 1982 Amerasian Im-
migration Act, providing protection and lawful status to the abandoned 
children of U.S. service members in Southeast Asia,333 or interpreters as-
sisting the U.S. military in the Middle East, who faced great risks to their 
lives.334 
The recently sworn in 116th Congress has the potential to be less re-
sistant to meaningful immigration reform. Indeed, this Congress repre-
sents the most diverse Congress to date, including a record 102 women; 
the first Native American woman; the first Muslim-American woman; as 
well as congresswomen and men of color from across the country.335 
The following Part outlines suggested norms and components of po-
tential legislation that this session of Congress might consider. That said, 
given the particular political moment in which we are living, and the his-
torical, political, and humanitarian tensions outlined above, it would be 
disingenuous to suggest that a perfect or simple solution exists.336 Rather 
than attempt perfection, what follows are suggestions of norms and fixes 
that would ideally guide meaningful congressional action. 
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As a starting point, this legislation should reiterate and reinforce the 
principles outlined in the ABC Case. Adjudicators must be reminded of 
their obligations to consider the merits of each case and avoid discrimina-
tion in adjudication of claims from particular countries. Next, this legisla-
tion should address the unique cluster of factors driving migration from 
the Northern Triangle, as well as the legacy of intervention, racism, and 
animus the U.S. government has shown toward the region. Like TPS be-
fore it, appropriate legislation should designate Central American mi-
grants as a class rather than as individual applicants; not because their 
claims are uniform, but because patterns of private violence by gangs, abu-
sive partners and cartels, weak governments, and impunity are widespread 
in the region, and because the U.S. government has been a critical driver 
of these realities. Central American migrants are fleeing the same kinds of 
civil strife that TPS anticipated. Unlike TPS, however, this legislation 
would provide a pathway to lawful status and protection that could ripen 
into citizenship. While others have suggested a more temporary, short-
term response with repatriation as a goal,337 this Article argues that real 
repair requires the possibility of more permanency given the legacies of 
discrimination, racism, and the underlying instability and violence that 
continue to plague the region.  
In consideration of the limitations of humanitarian asylum articulated 
above, whether or not this legislation would require that migrants conform 
to the refugee definition set out in the Refugee Convention is an interesting 
one. Surely there are “many compelling drivers of migration that do not 
fall within the narrow international legal definition of a refugee.”338 At the 
same time, it is relevant and meaningful to recognize the violence Central 
Americans are fleeing today for what, in large part, it is—harm that rises 
to the level of persecution. Moreover, this Author is wary of increasing 
and politically motivated characterizations of this violence in ways that 
demean survivors and fail to recognize that harm of this kind can constitute 
persecution. 
In light of the present limitations of humanitarian asylum and the re-
quirements of PSGs and nexus, this Article proposes legislation that would 
not require migrants and refugees from the Northern Triangle to satisfy the 
refugee definition, though past and future harm could, and should, be cri-
teria for relief. One imagining of a pathway might include proof of past or 
future harm, the impossibility of internal relocation or state protection, as 
well as some other additional humanitarian factor that would compel re-
lief. In this way, this legislative remedy would acknowledge the very real 
and often very serious harm and violence Central Americans are fleeing 
without requiring them to satisfy problematic PSG and nexus require-
ments. 
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One possible “limit” on this legislation that could appropriately take 
into consideration the unique context and historical push and pull factors 
of migration from the Northern Triangle has been suggested by Professor 
Keyes. Namely, that “[o]nly those with a parent, grandparent, sibling or 
child already living in the United States could apply for this benefit.”339 
This would recognize the unique historical patterns of migration particular 
to Central American migrant communities as well as the role of the United 
States in pushing, and pulling generations of Central Americans to the 
United States.  
While not perfect, legislation adopting these norms and values is 
needed. The long history of discrimination and animus faced by asylum 
applicants from Central America requires congressional action to prevent 
further bias and asymmetry in asylum adjudication and ensure protection 
to migrants fleeing harm. 
E. “Floodgates” Fears 
To begin with, arguments based on fear of opening the proverbial 
“floodgates” are pervasive in immigration law. So too might they arise in 
this context. While the total number of migrants apprehended at the south-
ern U.S.–Mexico border are near their lowest levels in more than forty 
years,340 the number of apprehended unaccompanied children and families 
is on the rise.341 The United Nations Refugee Agency reports that requests 
for asylum from people from the Northern Triangle of Guatemala, El Sal-
vador, and Honduras increased 25% from 2016 to 2017.342  
But this Article argues that these fears are unfounded. For one, it is 
possible that legislative relief could apply only to those noncitizens al-
ready present in the United States.343 Even if relief were prospective or 
included prospective carve outs for future migrants, we have seen—and 
overcome—"floodgates” argument pushback before. In 1996, the Board 
acknowledged that the practice of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) could 
be the basis for a claim of asylum for Fauziya Kasinga.344 As Karen Mu-
salo has written, many who opposed a grant of asylum for Ms. Kasinga 
pointed to the fact that millions of women a year are subject to practices 
of FGM and female genital cutting.345 Despite fears that a grant of asylum 
to Ms. Kasinga would lead to a dramatic increase in the number of women 
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and girls seeking asylum from across the globe, there was no “appreciable 
increase in the number of claims based on FGM” in the post-Kasinga 
era.346 In a separate context, amidst the decades-long litigation to provide 
protection to women fleeing domestic violence, it was the immigration 
agency itself that conceded that “floodgates’” fears were unwarranted. At 
the time, the then INS acknowledged that it “did not expect to see a large 
number of claims if the United States recognized domestic violence as a 
basis of asylum.”347 Finally, these arguments are specious at their core: if 
you satisfy the definition of a refugee, you are a refugee regardless of how 
many others are also refugees. As the Seventh Circuit explains, “The 
breadth of the social group says nothing about the requirements for asy-
lum, just as the breadth of categories under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act says nothing about who is eligible to sue an employer for discrimina-
tion.”348 
Ultimately, a fear of “floodgates” also underestimates the considera-
ble expense—financially, physically, and emotionally—of journeying to 
the United States. Indeed, the cost of the journey north from Central Amer-
ica is not only monetary—which today can be more than $9,000 U.S. dol-
lars349—but also tremendously risky. Children and adults have reported 
pervasive physical and sexual violence, kidnappings, death by dehydra-
tion, or at the hands of a drug cartel, among other horrors.350 The persecu-
tion a migrant is fleeing would have to be catastrophic to risk such violence 
on the road north. 
F. Security Concerns 
Other opponents to congressional immigration relief may point to se-
curity concerns, suggesting that given the numbers of migrants fleeing 
gang violence, some unaccompanied children or asylum-seeking adults 
may in fact be gang members hoping to take advantage of the immigration 
system. Indeed, the current Administration has championed this talking 
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point at every opportunity, claiming members of the Central American mi-
grant caravan are “hardened criminals” and members of MS-13.351 Not 
only have many gang allegations been proven to be greatly exaggerated 
and erroneous352 but such concerns also fail to account for the extensive 
background checks, including identity and security checks, that applicants 
for asylum must endure prior to being granted relief.353 According to U.S. 
Border Patrol Acting Chief Carla Provost, of all unaccompanied minors 
apprehended at the southwest border since 2012, only 0.06% were either 
suspected or confirmed to have ties to gangs in their home country.354 That 
is a meager 159 minors out of more than 250,000.355 In the United States 
presently, MS-13 is absent from most cities and towns across America, 
holding steady at just 10,000 members nationwide since 2006.356 Accord-
ing to the FBI, there are an estimated 1.4 million total gang members in 
the United States.357 Put another way, MS-13 accounts for less than 1% 
(0.71%) of all U.S. gang membership. In short, there is no indication that 
MS-13, or any other Central American criminal street gang, is taking ad-
vantage of our immigration system or other supposed “loopholes” to enter 
the United States under the guise of needing protection. 
CONCLUSION 
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have some of the highest rates 
of violence across the globe.358 In 2015, El Salvador received the dubious 
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distinction of being the single most dangerous country in the world with 
an astonishing homicide rate of 103 per 100,000.359 The role of the United 
States in enabling this violence and creating this peril cannot be under-
stated. From toppling regimes that lead to decades-long dictatorships,360 to 
training and funding militaries with atrocious human rights records,361 to 
housing the streets and jails that gave rise to the MS-13 gang and then 
systematically deported its members,362 the United States has been central 
to the creation of violence, conflict, and abuse across Central America. As 
the refugees of these man-made disasters have fled to our borders seeking 
protection, we have almost consistently met them with discrimination, an-
imus, and even violence. Now is the time to turn the page on the decades 
of the racism and asymmetrical application of the law they have endured.  
Informed by the principles of humanitarian asylum, TPS, and class 
action lawsuits providing prior relief to Central Americans, Congress must 
now provide reparations to these refugees. Congress must act to provide a 
pathway to protection tailored to this class of migrants to ensure that their 
rights and lives are protected. Today, William is still waiting for his asy-
lum case to be heard by an IJ; the next step in his efforts to seek protection 
here in the United States. With a nationwide immigration court backlog of 
more than 869,000 cases,363 William may wait for some time for his case 
to be heard. Hopefully, when that day comes, the protection he deserves 
will be available to him. 
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